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ABSTRACT

The proposed research addresses the following questions: “Have AfricanAmericans become more conservative over the last 25 years?” While numerous
commentators have noted the existence of a Black conservative group, heretofore,
none have attempted to document this phenomenon empirically. In fact, the
question of whether conservatism has substantial support in the Black community
remains unanswered (Welch & Combs, 85; Welch & Foster, 87; Randolph, 95).
The purpose of this dissertation is to systematically address the preceding
question through the use of the National Black Election Study (1984, 1988, &
1996) and the National Election Study.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The main focus of this research is conservative ideology among AfricanAmericans. Although we know a great deal about ideology in general, very little
is known about African-Americans and ideology.
This research seeks to address the following questions: Have AfricanAmericans become more conservative over the last 25 years? How has Black
conservatism developed? Is Black conservatism distinctly different from
conservatism in the White community? Does Black conservatism lead to
different electoral preferences and partisan identification than White
conservatism?
Conservatism
Several authors have offered a cyclical theory of American politics. However,
none have attempted to document cycles empirically among African-Americans
(Smith, 1990; Schlesinger, 1986; Barber, 1980; Burnham, 1980; Sellars, 1965;
Key, 1955). The cycle most relevant to this study is Schlesinger’s liberalconservative electoral cycle. Schlesinger (1986) argues that American history is
characterized by repeated swings between periods of conservatism and periods of
liberalism. This cycle is prominent in realignment models of American politics,

which state that “the American party system consists characteristically of a
majority party and a minority party, both oriented around a particular set of
problems” (Schlesinger, 34). Aldrich (1995) states that these problems consist of
differing values, usually representing either a liberal or a conservative ideology.
For example, “the Democrats are more likely to favor the active intervention of
the government,” which represents a liberal position (8). “Whereas the
Republicans are much less so inclined,” which is commonly held to be a
conservative position (8). Because of these views, certain groups such as
minorities, the working class, and ethnic groups usually support the Democrats,
who are liberals, while the middle and upper classes, Christian fundamentalists,
and business leaders usually support the Republicans.
Historically, most political commentators have suggested that
conservatives are a homogenous group consisting of mainly educated, White
upper class Americans. However, conservatives today are a diverse lot; Jews,
Catholics, college students, union members, and Hispanics are among nationally
renowned conservative voices. What about African-Americans? Although,
African-Americans and conservatives agree on a wide range of social issues,
research indicates that African-Americans remain overwhelmingly liberal and
thus loyal to the Democratic Party (Meyerson, 1984; Tryman, 1986; Welch &
Foster, 1987; Muzzio, 1992; Bolce, De Maio, & Muzzio, 1992; Dawson, 1995;
Goode, 1996; Simpson, 1998). Nonetheless, a number of African-American
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conservatives have become prominent in recent years. For example, Clarence
Thomas, Thomas Sowell, Armstrong Williams, Walter Williams, and Glen Loury
are all well known conservative intellectuals who have had their voices heard
throughout America (Randolph, 1995; Toler, 1993; Jones, 1987). Not only have
they been successful on the lecture circuit, but Black conservatives have also
formed various organizations, think-tanks, journals, and web sites to voice their
opinions and let America know that an alternative voice exists among AfricanAmericans (Goode, 1996; Boyer, 1998). There is also a growing number of
African-American Republican politicians. In fact, a record 25 Black Republicans
ran for Congress in 1994 (Ponnuru, 1996). It has also been documented that over
twenty-five percent of African-Americans have voted for Republican governors in
New Jersey, California, and Virginia (Reiland, 1996). Moreover, a Washington
Post poll reported that twenty-six percent of African-Americans identified
themselves as conservative. “They support prayer in schools, business incentives,
tougher sentencing for criminals, school vouchers, smaller government, welfare
reform, and lower taxes” (Reiland, 1996:9).
There are several reasons to expect an increase in the number of AfricanAmericans identifying themselves as conservative. Among them is increasing
upward mobility. The more African-Americans integrate with the White middleclass, the more we would expect them to imitate their political beliefs and become
more conservative. Scholars state that the views of Blacks, especially middle
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class Blacks, will probably change over time. They note that the Black middle
class will eventually have the same views as middle class Whites. They would
desire the same policies and programs as middle class Whites. One scholar put it
this way: “the growing Black middle class would be drawn toward a conservative
platform as it became more prosperous” (Ashbee, 1999:241). This is not an
unusual expectation because we know that higher income people tend to be more
conservative and are less likely to believe that the government should be involved
in social programs (Welch and Foster, 1987). In general, Blacks tend to agree
with conservatives on issues such as personal values, crime, and the death
penalty. Moreover, DeVeaux (1997) states, “The fact is, most Blacks have a
conservative understanding of people and things. They have deep and abiding
appreciation for traditional values” (22). We also know that increasing numbers
of African-Americans are displeased with the failure of government programs.
They believe that these programs have caused problems in the Black community.
Black conservatives believe that these programs have created a sense of
dependency among African-Americans. They have also caused the deterioration
of Black families. What was once referred to as an oxymoron may now be “an
important and controversial movement in America that touches raw nerve among
liberals” (Gaiter, 1991:1). According to one scholar, the agreement between
conservatives and Blacks, “is more likely to lead them to vote Republican”
(Ashbee, 1999:241). Thus, despite evidence to support the notion of Black
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allegiance to the Democratic party, political scientists must not assume that all
African-Americans identify themselves as liberals. But does this group of
conservative intellectuals have a constituency in the African-American
community?
Some have argued that they do not, stating that “recent Black
conservatism is inauthentic, without true roots in the Black communities”
(Einsenstadt, 1999:xxvii). Most Black Americans believe that conservatism is a
step backward rather than forward. In short, the Black community has rejected
Black conservatism. Other scholars refer to the Black conservative group as
media hype because many of them have syndicated newspaper columns or radio
talk shows where their views may be heard more than other leaders in the Black
community. Randolph, (1995) states that “the liberal media indirectly served as a
conduit for Black conservative voices” (155). Benjamin Hooks, former chairman
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
also believes that the talk about Black conservatives is greatly exaggerated. He
states that “Their names couldn’t fill a small-town phonebook” (Gaiter, 1991).
Even though there is anecdotal evidence that Blacks are becoming conservative,
that evidence has been attacked by public opinion organizations. For example,
these organizations state that a large gulf remains between Black conservatives
and the Black community. The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies,
for example, found that a major belief of Black conservatives, limited government
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involvement in social policy, is rejected by most Blacks (Gaiter, 1991).
Moreover, even as a conservative trend has been documented in the general
electorate, African-Americans often feel that supporting this trend along with
their White counterparts is inimical to their interests (Tryman, 1986; Barker, et.
al, 1999). Consequently, Black conservatives have been unable to convince most
African-Americans that a conservative ideology is politically advantageous.
Today, African-American conservative intellectuals have a higher profile
than ever. But have the masses of African-Americans become more
conservative? Political scientists have for the most part ignored this question.
Several scholars, however, have noted the importance of studying this new group
of African-American conservatives. Among them is political scientist Mack
Jones (1987), who argues that, “The political thought of the new Black
conservative is an important factor which could influence the course of the Black
struggle for equality in the United States” (Randolph, 149). Lewis Randolph
(1995) echoes this sentiment. He states that the general conservative tide among
the White population and racial polarization tactics being used by the Republican
party make the study of African-American conservatives “imperative at this time”
(149).
Therefore, it is important to examine the apparent conservative “trend”
among African-Americans. Not only may African-American conservatism affect
the struggle for equality, but the mere existence of an African-American
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conservative cohort raises questions about African-Americans’ overwhelming
loyalty to the Democratic party and questions concerning a possible realignment
(Welch & Foster, 1987).
Ideological Trends
Historically, there have been major shifts in American electoral politics between
periods of liberalism and conservatism. These shifts have been demonstrated in
the literature through examinations of the ideological identifications of the
electorate. As Emerson noted in 1841: “The two parties which divide the state,
the party of Conservatism and that of Innovation are very old, and have disputed
the possession of the world ever since it was made… Now one, now the other gets
the day, and still the fight renews itself as if for the first time, under new names
and hot personalities” (Schlesinger, 23). In short, the conflict between
conservatism and liberalism is not new. This trend was well documented in the
1950s and 1960s. Since then, however, researchers have more or less ignored it.
Although many scholars saw the Reagan era as a conservative backlash
against expansionist government, political scientists have failed to find conclusive
evidence that the electorate has become more conservative (Knight & Erikson,
1997; Miller, 1992; Smith, 1990; Robinson & Fleishman, 1984). While some
researchers discovered increased conservative identification during the late 1970s
and early 1980s, others have reached conflicting conclusions (Smith, 1990 &
Robinson & Fleishman, 1988).
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The ebb and flow between periods of liberalism and conservatism has not
been well documented among African-Americans. While scholars have provided
anecdotal evidence suggesting a conservative trend in the general electorate, very
few have attempted empirically to document this phenomenon among AfricanAmericans. Although there are several notable intellectuals who profess a
conservative ideology, one question remains: Do these self-proclaimed
conservative leaders have a following in the African-American community?
Although other scholars have attempted to examine conservatism in the
mass public, none have attempted to address the existence of a Black conservative
group in the general electorate. The few studies that have sought to examine
Black conservatism either fails to examine the historical context of conservatism
in the Black community or fails empirically to demonstrate that there are
segments of the Black population which identify with conservatism. The research
contained in this paper attempts to not only document their existence by using
national survey data, but it also seeks an understanding of the development of
Black conservatism. This research also seeks to fill these gaps by answering the
following questions: Is there an African-American conservative cohort in the
electorate? Is Black Conservatism distinctly different from conservatism among
Whites? And, does Black Conservatism lead to different electoral preferences
and partisan identification than White conservatism?
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Answers to these questions will help to close a large gap in the literature.
The plan of this dissertation is as follows. First, a discussion of ideology in the
general electorate will be undertaken. Any research that attempts to examine
ideology should start with the landmark studies and discuss how the study of
ideology has evolved in political science. Therefore, this section will focus on
ideology as a concept, the public’s level of ideological sophistication, and more
recent developments in the operationalization of ideology. For comparative
purposes, ideological trends in the general electorate will also be discussed.
Second, conservatism in the African-American community will be discussed.
This section will define conservatism by describing the political thought of Black
conservative political figures of the past and present. Ideological trends among
African-Americans will also be discussed. And finally, the latter section will
introduce the research questions.
In order to examine these questions, this research will rely heavily on
survey data from large national data sets. These are: (1) the biennial election
studies from the Center from Political Studies (CPS) of the University of
Michigan conducted from 1972-1998 and (2) a collection of studies also done by
CPS from 1984, 1988, and 1996. Both data sets are nationally recognized and
contain samples of approximately 1500 adults.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Ideology
Belief systems [ideology] have never surrendered easily to empirical study
or quantification. Indeed, they have often served as primary exhibits for
the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and that
what can be measured is not important to study (Converse, 1964:206).

The study of ideology is an important part of understanding political
behavior. Although there is general agreement among political scientists that
ideology is important, there is still considerable disagreement about the concept
itself. It was not until the 1940s and 1950s, with the advancement of behaviorism
in the social sciences, that scholars undertook systematic and empirical analyses
of ideology. Attention to ideology resulted from attempts to observe, analyze and
explain political behavior.
Most of the disagreement surrounding ideology concerns what the term
actually means and how it should be conceptualized and measured. One recurring
question is whether or not the American electorate is fully capable of
understanding what an ideology is. A related question concerns whether or not
individuals are capable of using ideology as a tool to assist them in making
important political decisions.
10

Historically, scholars of pubic opinion have used ideological terms to
describe how Americans think about politics. These descriptions rest upon the
notion that the public’s view of politics somehow mirrors those of political elites.
Nonetheless, political scientists discovered that many citizens are unaware of
what ideology as a concept means.
Political scientists themselves are unsure of how to define ideology. In
fact, there are several definitions of ideology. Political scientist commonly refer
to ideologies as “systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent
(McClosky, 1964:362). In other words, an ideology assists the individual in
making sense of the political world. An ideology comprises a pattern of opinions
on particular issues that stem from a basic underlying belief. The presence of an
ideology aids an individual in forming opinions on a wide range of social,
economic and political issues. It was once believed by Converse (1964) that a
person who had an ideology took consistent positions on all issues. More
recently, this assumption has been rebutted and individuals can identify with
either group without subscribing to all of its beliefs.
The most common terms used when describing ideology in America are
“liberal” and “conservative.” Any research that deals with ideology must define
what the terms liberal and conservative mean. Most scholars would agree with
the following definitions of liberalism and conservatism offered:
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Today’s liberals believe that unfettered economic markets are limited in
their ability to serve the public welfare, and that government must play an
active role in regulating business and in rectifying gross imbalances in
economic power and the distribution of wealth. This belief is in stark
contrast to the conservative creed of governmental noninterference in
private economic and social choices. Liberals are convinced that political
and social egalitarianism are the instruments of democratic government,
and that democratic government must be trusted as the register of the
common good. Thus, although they are not unconcerned with economic
liberties, and have promoted protection of the rights of workers and their
opportunities for self-determination, liberals place their priority on social
justice and civil equality, whereas conservatives place individual
economic freedom of business entrepreneurs at the top of their list of
concerns. Yet, liberals have never lost sight of the potential for tyranny in
big government; typically, they have opposed governmental regulation of
the ‘private’ realms of political and personal choice, again in contrast to
conservatives, who are generally willing to cede these points to
government (Collins and Skover, 1988:189,195).

More specifically, liberals are portrayed as believing that government
should play an active role in domestic policy by helping individuals and
communities with health, education and welfare. Liberals also demonstrates
tolerance for social change and diversity, and opposition to excessive military
spending and imperialism. Conversely, conservatism demonstrates a strong
resistance to government involvement in domestic affairs. Conservatives also
firmly support economic individualism, a strong defense establishment, and
traditional social values. Although some of the views and beliefs of these two
camps have altered over the years, the bases of these ideologies remain the same.
The reliability of these terms rests on the notion that the liberalconservative continuum has proven exceedingly useful in Western society. As
12

Converse (1964) notes, the use of this yardstick conveys a wealth of information
when describing political objects such as legislation. While the use of the liberalconservative continuum is common among political elites, ideological thinking is
somewhat rare in the mass public. Even though scholars generally agree on what
the terms liberal and conservative mean, there is no guarantee that individuals
who adopt these labels will adopt the meanings that scholars have given these
terms.
The Importance of Ideology
Ideology is important to the study of American politics because it is assumed to
affect political behavior. Implicit in most research on ideology is the notion that
the electorate uses some type of organization in making political decisions.
Traditionally, political scientists have believed that it is vital to the success of
democracy for citizens to be informed in their political decision-making (Maddox
and Lillie, 1984). In fact, the earliest views of the American citizen were
optimistic and purported that citizens were “attentive, informed, and rational” in
their political decision-making (Maddox and Lillie, 1984:24). The "textbook"
citizen was portrayed as ideological and politically active (Maddox and Lillie,
1984).
While there has always been general agreement among scholars that
ideology is important, there has been consistent disagreement about the ability of
the general electorate to think along ideological lines (McClosky, 1958; Campbell
13

et al., 1960: Converse, 1964; Converse and Markus, 1979; Conover and Feldman,
1981; Luttbeg and Gant, 1985; Knight, 1990; Knight and Erikson, 1997). In the
1960s, the textbook citizen was displaced by the view that most citizens were not
ideological. Today, however, most scholars agree that the use of ideological
labels plays a significant role in voter behavior.
Scholars have consistently sought to determine how ideology affects issue
orientation. More specifically, research has attempted to discover what
importance the electorate places on ideological self-identification and what role
ideology plays in determining the outcome of an election. Despite repeated
attempts to revive the view of the "textbook citizen," there continues to be
suspicion that many voters are irrational and uninformed when making political
decisions or at least most citizens do not act along ideological lines.
Ideology and the Electorate
Numerous scholars have studied ideology. While many early studies assess
whether or not the electorate has some level of political sophistication, latter
studies have attempted to be broader in their approach to ideology. In fact, more
recent studies look at ideology through the self-identification measure. Even
though scholars that used the self-identification measure realize the importance of
whether or not the electorate is political sophisticated, they choose to concentrate
specifically on what impact ideology has on political behavior. While research
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about ideology has produced a wealth of knowledge, the results of these studies
are somewhat contradictory and it has gaps.
More specifically, early research on ideology examined political
sophistication and latter research examines the electorate’s placement on the 7point scale. Both bodies of work fail to examine how ideology affects AfricanAmericans. Previous research fails to examine African-Americans’ and their
levels of political sophistication or their placement on the liberal-conservative
continuum. Thus, it has ignored a group in the American electorate, which could
impact electoral politics. Furthermore, previous research also fails to document
the claim of an emerging conservative class among African-Americans. This
research seeks to fill this gap.
In order to understand the significance of ideology, the researcher should
understand how the study of ideology has evolved. This will be accomplished
through a discussion of the earliest studies of ideology. First, The American Voter
(1956) will be discussed. Next, an examination of Converse's seminal work on
ideology, “The Nature of Beliefs Systems in the Mass Publics” (1964) will be
undertaken. Afterwards, research rebutting the conclusions of these works will be
discussed.
The Unsophisticated Electorate
Most of the work concerning ideology can be traced back to either The American
Voter (1956), or “The Nature of Belief Systems in the Mass Publics” (1964).
15

These two works set the research agenda and the parameters of the debate
concerning ideology. Scholars continue to use the conclusions of these studies as
baselines. Although their findings have come under attack, researchers have
generally accepted their definitions and methods.
The first portrait of an ideologue is provided by Campbell, Converse,
Miller and Stokes (1960), whom were primarily interested in determining the role
of party identification in determining voting behavior. As a way of determining
that role, it was imperative to examine the electorate’s attitude structures. They
assumed that attitude structures in the electorate were similar to partisan
preferences in that both would be stable and that attitude structures contributed to
the constancy of partisan preferences.
They viewed ideology “as a particularly elaborate, close-woven, and farranging structure of attitudes” (192). The existence of an ideology allows an
individual to organize his/her beliefs in some coherent fashion. Later scholars
have generally agreed with Campbell et al’s definition of ideology, stating that it
is “an abstract, integrated view of the political world giving rise to a logical
structure of attitudes toward policy issues, political parties, and candidates”
(Lyons and Scheb, 1992:573).
Two measurements of ideology were derived from TAV: attitude
structures, and level of conceptualization. An attitude structure, later referred to
as constraint, provides evidence that citizens know what issues go together.
16

Theoretically, this means that liberals will take consistently liberal positions on
issues and conservatives will take consistently conservative positions. This is
largely a result of an ideological predisposition to which the issue is related. TAV
drew a close analogy between the level of conceptualization index and a
taxonomic system, whereby perceived objects and events are coded into classes
where a more general range of objects required a more abstract concept of
classification.
Being the first scholars to give a portrait of the ideologue, Campbell,
Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960), state that the individual whom possesses an
ideology--"an ideologue"--would be able to make sense of a wide range of
political events. The ideologue would be able to conceptualize politics by
interpreting political behavior and change through some type of abstract or
philosophical ideological lens. For example, ideologues are those who perceive a
liberal-conservative continuum on which various political objects may be located,
and may shift over time. Additionally, ideologues are capable of locating political
parties and themselves on the continuum. Non-ideological individuals are
incapable of these tasks.
In their landmark study, the authors of The American Voter replaced the
idea of a "textbook citizen" with a new view of the “nonideological citizen.”
Being the first scholars to attempt to quantitatively deal with the concept of
ideology through the use of survey techniques, they concluded that Americans
17

were not ideological. Of primary importance in their research are two items: the
level of connectedness between citizen’s attitudes and opinions, and the degree of
differentiation of the citizen’s political world. The basic question is whether or
not the electorate is “sensitive to its own policy mood in terms of a left-right
continuum; and is sensitive as well to the shifting policy positions of both parties
on the same continuum” (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960:217).
More specifically, the interest lies in the level of conceptualization used to assess
political events and whether or not their preferences can be documented by
references to specific policy debates. In short, they were “interested in the
structure of thought that the individual applies to politics” (Campbell, et al.
1960:222).
Citizens were assigned various levels of conceptualization on the basis of
their responses to “like/dislike” questions about political parties and candidates.
These levels of conceptualization were intended to provide a single judgement as
to levels of ideological sophistication. Four levels of conceptualization were
operationalized: “ideologues” (Level A), “group benefits” voters (Level B),
“nature of the times” voters (Level C), and “no issue content” voters (Level D).
Respondents categorized as ideologues, the highest level of abstraction, were
those whose responses consisted of any abstract conception that could be
associated with an ideology. While explicit use of the liberal-conservative
continuum was unnecessary, a demonstration that political objects could be
18

located on that continuum was essential. Suprisingly, while this category
represents the highest level of abstraction, only 12% of the sample and 15% of
eligible voters in the 1956 election fit into this category.
The second level, labeled as “group benefits” voters, were those who
responded in terms of group interests or “ideology by proxy,” which consisted of
50% of the sample, and 60% of the voters. This was the modal category. This
group did not articulate any group interest or any sense of ideological structure.
Instead, they referred to current issues and accounted for 24% of the sample and
23% of voters. The final group contains those who evaluated candidates and
parties without reference to issues or ideology. This group contained 22 ½% of
the sample and 17 ½% of voters. Thus, the authors of TAV concluded that less
than 20% of the electorate was capable of conceptualizing politics along the
liberal-conservative continuum. Therefore, the belief became prevalent among
political scientists that the bulk of the American electorate were politically
unsophisticated.
Converse (1964) confirmed the findings of TAV. Although his view of
ideology is similar to TAV’s, Converse expands on the definition of ideology and
instead chooses to the use the term “belief system.” A belief system is defined as
“a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together
by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (207). Along with this
new approach to ideology is the introduction of the notion of constraint, which is
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a determinant of whether or not a person has a belief system. Constraint is “the
success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual
holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes” (207).
The higher the level of constraint, the more likely it is that someone’s view can be
predicted with knowledge of their opinions on other issues. If an individual
possesses a high level of constraint, there is “a high degree of consistency among
political attitudes-attitudes on a wide range of issues falling into clear liberal and
conservative tendencies” (Nie and Anderson, 1974:541).
Converse (1964) focused on the differences in the nature of belief systems
held by political elites and the masses. Converse states that many historical
observations were based upon a common assumption that the mass public
mirrored the belief systems of political elites. However, he argues that, “there are
important and predictable differences in ideational worlds as we progress
downward through such ‘belief strata’ and that these differences, while obvious at
one level, are easily overlooked and not infrequently miscalculated” (206). What
he means is that when one moves down the ladder from political elites to the mass
public, there is a decrease in the level of constraint in mass belief systems.
Converse (1964) confirms this argument and the original findings of TAV,
and documents the public’s lack of ideological thinking. By re-interviewing
original respondents from the 1956 survey and introducing the terms “liberal” and
“conservative” in survey questions for the first time, respondents were asked if
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they knew which party was most liberal and which was most conservative. Even
though the proportion of respondents understanding the terms was approximately
20% of the sample, Converse found that only 17% of the sample could be
categorized as having a broad philosophy (a number slightly higher than TAV’s
12%). Thirty-seven percent of the respondents were entirely vague as to the
meaning of the term, a higher proportion than was found in TAV.
In an attempt to further explore the public’s levels of ideological thinking,
Converse attempted to measure levels of constraint through an examination of
attitudes and opinions on a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues. He
states, “When it comes down to specific attitudes and behaviors, the organization
is there nonetheless, and it is this organization that matters, not the capacity for
discourse in sophisticated language” (228). Not surprisingly, Converse found
higher levels of constraint among the elite than the mass public. More
specifically, there is a lack of information in the mass public. In other words, the
general public is less capable of realizing that broad beliefs of culturally familiar
principles and specific cases belong in the same belief system. For example,
when respondents are asked about concepts such as freedom and democracy, their
beliefs are highly constrained, but where more specific policy issues are
concerned, the individual is incapable of realizing that it belongs to the same
belief system. Converse (1964) therefore concludes that the public’s opinions are
not highly constrained, and that many responses are random, suggesting that
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many citizens have “nonattitudes.” In sum, both cornerstone studies of ideology
in the American electorate concluded that the mass public is incapable of
conceptualizing the political world in liberal-conservative terms.
A Sophisticated Electorate?
The conclusion that the American electorate is non-ideological has not been
universally accepted (Field and Anderson, 1969; Pierce, 1970; Nie and Anderson,
1974; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976). While Campbell et al. (1960) and
Converse’s (1964) studies established a paradigm in electoral behavior research,
their research was criticized in subsequent studies. Two schools of thought
emerged from critiques of these landmark studies. The first school of thought
consists of scholars that criticize the methods utilized in early studies while the
second consists of scholars whom have argued against the results of early studies
because they are from a single time period. In short, both schools of thought
argue that scholars should be careful when accepting the findings from early
works.
Scholars who belong to the first school of thought raise questions about
the methods of the landmark studies. They argue either that the definitions used
in these studies were too restrictive or that the measurements of ideology were
flawed. For example, common to both measurements level of conceptualization
and constraint is the idea that the terms “liberal” and “conservative” are “capping
abstractions’ each summarizing a highly constrained set of attitudes” (Lyons and
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Scheb, 1992:573). There is also general agreement that a belief system provides
an economical way for an individual to conceptualize the political world into a
general understanding. In addition, scholars recognize in these conceptualizations
of ideology that substantial cognitive skill is a necessary component for an
individual to be able to consistently align issue positions and vote choice along
ideological lines.
Research that attacks the methodology utilized in landmark studies argues
that the statistical analyses used are incorrect and inadequate for the study of mass
belief systems. For example, Pefley and Hurwitz, (1985) believe that Converse’s
use of correlation coefficients contributed significantly to his inability to find
evidence of ideological constraint in the electorate. According to Converse’s
view, constraint is central to a belief system and a necessary element of an
ideology. Constraint is the consistency between component idea elements in an
ideology. It involves more than consistency between issue positions. It also
connotes consistency between concrete views and more abstract beliefs. This
latter requirement makes it necessary to utilize methods more sophisticated than
correlation analysis. According to some scholars, the difficulty in documenting
evidence of constraint in the electorate could be a result of the use of this
unsophisticated statistical procedure (Pefley and Hurwitz, 1985). Furthermore,
some researchers have suggested that sophisticated ideologies are often multidimensional and call for more advanced techniques. Therefore the use of
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correlation analysis as a measurement tool for ideological structures more
complex than the liberal-conservative dimension are inappropriate (Luttbeg,
1968; Maddox and Lillie, 1984).
To demonstrate the necessity of advanced methodologies, Pefley and
Hurwitz, (1985) developed a new causal model of ideology which suggests that
causation flows from abstract attitudes consisting of liberal/conservative
positions, to general policy attitudes, to specific policy attitudes. Utilizing a
LISREL model from an independent survey, they found constraint levels,
measured as the relationship between general and specific elements, much higher
than in previous studies. They concluded that traditional methods of
measurement consistently underestimated levels of constraint.
Scholars who comprise the second school of thought, those which criticize
early studies, warn that the findings are all based on a single historical time
period. Furthermore, they argue that there are various reasons to expect a more
ideological electorate, higher levels of educational attainment and a changing
political landscape. In contrast to the dim view of the electorate offered by TAV
(1960) and Converse (1964), several scholars note that ideological thinking is not
at all uncommon in the American electorate (Nie and Andersen, 1974; Nie et al.,
1976). The most powerful statement of a changing and thus more sophisticated
electorate is found in The Changing American Voter (1976). Using identical
techniques as TAV, which classified a low proportion of the electorate as
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ideologues, CAV documents a substantial increase in the number of ideologues
after 1952. CAV also documents an increase in levels of constraint. They state:

The increase in issue consistency across issues means that individuals who
answer a question on one topic in a liberal direction are now more likely to
answer liberally on another topic, and vice versa for conservative answers
(137).

CAV goes on further to argue that the dim view of the electorate stated by TAV
could largely result from the fact that it is time bound and analyzes only one
election year as opposed to several.
CAV was merely an extension of the work done previously by Nie and
Andersen, (1974). CAV argues that past studies are rather limited because they
are based on data from a single historical period. Utilizing techniques similar to
those used by Converse, CAV found major increases in levels of attitude
consistency in the mass public since 1956. Moreover, in an analysis of
presidential elections from 1952-1972, Nie et al. (1976) confirm that the
electorate has become more politically sophisticated since TAV. More
specifically, they find that the proportion of the electorate that can be considered
ideologues increased dramatically between 1956 and 1972. In an analysis of the
consistency between issue positions, most correlations in the 1956 data set were
consistently low or negative, a finding consistent with Converse. However,
analysis of respondents from the 1964 data set reveal striking results. Nie and
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Andersen (1974) found that respondents who took liberal/conservative positions
on one issue also took liberal stands on other issues. Therefore:

The existing description of low levels of attitude consistency in the mass
public and the absence of an over-arching liberal/conservative ideology
indicated by this lack of consistency no longer appears accurate (559).

Additional studies that suggest a reasonably sophisticated electorate
employ the self-identification approach to studying ideology (Levitin and Miller,
1979; Gant and Luttbeg, 1985; Knight, 1985). More specifically, when
comparing respondents in latter studies to those of the 1950s, one finds a
reasonably sophisticated electorate (Gant and Luttbeg, 1985). This is largely
because substantial proportions of the population are now capable of attributing
the correct characteristics to the terms liberal and conservative.
Back to the Unsophisticated Electorate
While there is anecdotal evidence to suggest increasing levels of political
sophistication, several later scholars have stated that these results are unfounded.
In his own analysis of belief systems in the mass public which offered conflicting
conclusions, Stimson (1975) urges scholars to use caution when discussing the
alleged importance of ideology. More specifically, when an examination of
ideology in the mass public takes place, its impact will be overstated because
large percentages of the electorate “systematically selects itself out of such
analyses by not voting and not responding to measures of ideology” (400). He
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also reminds us of the importance of formal education and its association with
ideological sophistication. Stimson notes that respondents of higher cognitive
abilities assign more meaning to the liberal-conservative continuum than those of
lower abilities. Furthermore, it is difficult to state what the liberal-conservative
dimension means to these respondents or even if it has meaning for them.
Therefore, he concludes: “For the electorate as a whole, the evidence suggests that
these widely used concepts have no shared connotations” (403).
Even some of the research dealing with ideological self-identification,
presumably a new approach, confirms the findings of Converse and TAV (Holm
and Robinson, 1978; Levitin and Miller, 1979; Conover and Feldman, 1981; Gant
and Luttbeg, 1985). Although individuals have demonstrated the ability to place
themselves on the scale, a close examination of ideological self-identification as it
corresponds to the respondent's thermometer ratings of liberals and conservatives,
as well as closed-ended questions on specific issues, reveals striking conclusions.
The public’s use of ideological labels is "largely symbolic" and "non-issue
oriented" in meaning (Conover and Feldman, 1981). This finding was confirmed
by later research, which asked respondents to list what they thought the terms
liberal and conservative meant. About 40% of the respondents could not give any
description of what they believed these terms mean. Furthermore, most of the
research concludes that at least a third of respondents are incapable of placing
themselves on the 7-point ideological scale, thereby being labeled as apolitical or
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possessing a non-attitude where citizens confessed themselves ignorant of any
type of ideological thinking (Converse, 1964; Holm and Robinson, 1978; Levitin
and Miller, 1979).
Furthermore, Gant and Luttbeg (1985), found that when citizens were
incapable of placing themselves on the scale, they responded to the selfidentification question by stating "that they had not thought much about the
words, or did not know what they meant" (Gant and Luttbeg, 1985:82). Knight
(1985) confirms this finding. In addition to finding that over 40% of the
respondents had not thought about where they would place themselves on a
liberal-conservative scale, more than half could be classified as political
inarticulates. However, of those considered to be ideologues, ideological
placement had a more significant impact on candidate choice than partisan
identification. But ideologues accounted for only 22.1% of the sample and 26.2%
of voters. This study confirms the work of Converse and The American Voter. In
short, it is evident to a large number of scholars that "many members of the public
may lack a complete understanding of such ideological terms {liberal and
conservative} as traditionally conceptualized" (Conover and Feldman, 1981).
Why the Change?
There continues to be wide disagreement among scholars concerning whether or
not the mass public is politically sophisticated. However, several have offered
reasons as to why the public has had increasing levels of political sophistication.
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There is also a group of scholars who argue that no real change has taken place;
that the mass public continues to lack political sophistication when it concerns
ideology.
Scholars who believe there has been a change in the mass public suggest
that many factors may have led to increased levels of political sophistication in
the electorate. Some researchers attribute it to the increased political salience of
the 1960s (Nie and Andersen, 1974). Others believe that the level of political
discourse in campaigns has increased citizens’ use of ideology. In particular, the
political landscape of the 1960s and 1970s contained many issues that were
divided along ideological lines and ideologically visible candidates (Robinson and
Fleishman, 1984). Along with this more interested citizenry, the argument goes,
came the dissemination of more political information, thus increasing consistency
between citizens attitudes and behaviors (Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, and
Bennet, 1978).
Some authors have noted that a politically sophisticated electorate could
be due to educational attainment. More specifically, Nie et al. (1976), see
increasing levels of political sophistication as a result of a more educated mass
public, they note that the proportion of the population most likely to be capable of
ideological thinking --those with at least some-- college training has increased.
Converse found attitude consistency to be rather low among the general public,
but that consistency increased with higher levels of education. Bishop et al.
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(1978) note that in 1952 only 15% of the population had some college training,
but by 1972, the figure nearly doubled to 29%. Furthermore the proportion of
citizens with less than a high school education decreased from 61% to 38% during
the same time span. Therefore, according to Converse’s model of mass belief
systems, changes such as these should correspond to a change in the public’s level
of ideological sophistication. However, while there have been substantial
increases in educational attainment, these shifts “have had little if any impact on
the changes in the structure of mass beliefs” (Nie et al., 1976:149). In fact,
increases in consistency have been greater for lower educational groups, which
according to the theory of mass beliefs would have less capacity for ideological
thinking. Thus, an increase in educational attainment does not account for
increase in issue consistency in the mass public.
Another explanation for increased political sophistication is the entrance
of a new population into the electorate. The data demonstrate that this is not the
case. Attitude consistency in all age groups increased at almost the same rate. So,
what can really account for the changes in the public’s level of ideological
thinking?
Political life has changed. The level of debate in elections, the salience of
issues and the penetration of politics into the lives of citizens have changed the
way most people think about politics. When one makes a comparison between
elections of the 1950s and the 1960s, politics has changed dramatically.
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Collectively, these events have all occurred along side the change in levels of
political sophistication. Nie et al. (1976) demonstrate the penetration of politics
into the lives of citizens through an analysis of political hopes and fears in
citizens’ personal life. For all educational levels, the penetration of politics has
increased, meaning that politics affects all citizens regardless of cognitive
abilities. Not only have issues become more relevant and salient to many citizens,
election campaigns have been filled with more ideological debates.
In an effort to document the increased saliency of politics to citizens,
Stimson (1975) examines the Nixon-McGovern election of 1972. Constant
ideological cues were provided to voters by the media. Specifically, the primaries
were always described as contests between the “left” and “right.” Stimson further
states that even the most apolitical segments of the electorate would have been
made aware of the ideological stances of the candidates. In addition to the
media’s coverage of the ideological positions in the election, issue positions were
also sharply drawn. In short, a final analysis of major changes in elections from
the placid 1950s to the 1970s is that elections of the latter provided “ideological
cues of unprecedented clarity and consistency” (396).
Some scholars doubt that there has actually been an increase in ideological
sophistication among the electorate. They state that either the methods utilized to
measure levels of conceptualization are incorrect or that the public has lacked an
interest in politics. More specifically, many scholars have noted and
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hypothesized that an increase in the political sophistication of the electorate is
directly related to changes in political motivation as a result of the 1964 election.
Therefore, if citizens are motivated about politics and are more sophisticated,
Bishop et al (1978) believe that they should also be more interested in politics.
However, analysis of the public’s interest in politics shows that there was no
change from 1960-1964.
Further evidence to discredit the claim of a more sophisticated electorate
suggests that this sophistication is largely a result of changes in surveys. Bishop
et al. (1978) attributes the rise in issue consistency to “a basic methodological
artifact: changes in question wording and format” (782). At the same time a
massive shift was noted in the electorate, the Michigan Survey Research Center
instituted major changes in the format and content of questions. According to
Bishop et al., this, “creates serious problems of comparability for trend analysis”
(253). Furthermore, it “raises the question of much of the change in mass
sophistication reported by Nie and others might be due to methodological
artifacts” (253). To directly test the artifact proposition, three different formats of
the Michigan survey issue questions were randomized to a national sample.
These sets included questions that were used prior to 1964, those instituted in
1964, and those used more recently. They concluded that when the changes in
question wording are taken into account, the changes in mass belief systems
disappear or are negligible.
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Smith (1980) also documents methodological problems in the level of
conceptualization measure, and concludes that the electorate is not more
ideologically aware. In an analysis of the “level of conceptualization” index
developed by Campbell et al. (1960), but also used by Field and Anderson (1969)
and Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, (1976), the reliability and validity of the measure is
called into question. In Smith’s rather frank discussion of the stability of the
levels of conceptualization measure, he states that whereas The American Voter
expected little change, Field and Andersen and Nie et al. accounted for some
variability in the measure due to environmental factors, such as the style and level
of interest in a presidential campaign. However, both concluded that levels
should remain relatively stable because a person’s cognitive ability is a permanent
trait and environmental factors would only influence those of higher cognitive
ability. Analyzing data from the 1956-1960 National Election Panel Study, Smith
concludes that the level of conceptualization measure is neither valid nor reliable.
Since the measure was projected to be a stable trait, findings of unreliability
suggest that conceptual sophistication is not really being measured, but rather a
measurement of short-term environmental forces. Responses to like and dislike
questions about candidates and parties could be a result of rhetoric to which the
person was exposed to by the current campaign or through the media. In the end,
it is difficult to conclude which argument is correct: an unsophisticated electorate
or a reasonably sophisticated electorate.
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In summary, despite the fact that Smith (1980) found the level of
conceptualization measure invalid and unreliable, scholars have continued to
study ideology and its impact on political behavior. In the end, there is evidence
to support both views of ideology. Two landmark studies, The American Voter
and Converse (1964), have been followed by more studies which suggest that the
public is incapable of ideological thinking due to limited cognitive abilities, a
relatively stable trait. Yet scholars have shown evidence to suggest otherwise.
For instance, increases in levels of education have contributed to higher cognitive
ability. Educational attainment was a trait Converse found necessary to engage in
ideological thinking. There have also been major changes in the political
environment. Changes in the political environment have facilitated more interest
and involvement in the political process among many individuals.
Toward a New Understanding of Ideology
More recently scholars have attempted to redefine the notion of ideology by
conceptualizing it through the use of the 7-point self-identification. Scholarly
disagreement over what the terms liberal and conservative mean has led to an
increased reliance on self-identification as the dominant measurement of
ideology. This research relies on this conceptualization to measure ideology,
although its limits are recognized (Lyons and Scheb, 1992). The earliest survey
question on ideological identification is available through the Roper Center asked
in the Gallup Poll in 1938:
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In politics, do you regard yourself as a liberal or conservative? (Robinson
and Fleishman, 1984:52)

This question did not provide respondents with a middle-of-the-road opinion,
therefore, more recently, ideological identification is measured through the use of
the following question found in both the General Social Survey and the Center for
Political Studies:
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I’m
going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that
people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to
extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this
scale? (Robinson and Fleishman, 1984:52)

This question allows the respondent more choices and it also gives an option for a
middle-of-the-road response. Moreover this measurement of ideological
identification allows for differentiation between different degrees of ideological
commitment.
The self-identification measure of ideology allows the researcher to gauge
the level of ideological thinking of the American electorate, whatever that level
may be. Furthermore, it also an extremely economical way to measure ideology
without being overly concerned with “what it is” (Knight, 1999). Although
scholars dismissed self-labeling in the past, the self-identification measure is
“now the dominant means of assessing individual ideology in political science”
(62). Its advantages are manifold. First and foremost, it relies on how the voter
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sees him/herself, and not whether or not he/she fits into a socially defined model.
Furthermore, it is analogous to the party identification measure because it allows
voters to align themselves with a group that may affect their vote choice. And
finally, it is general enough to include various forms of ideological thinking, from
those respondents who use the continuum in evaluating candidates to those whom
think policy issues out in ideological terms (Holm and Robinson, 1978).
However, the self-identification measure of ideology should not be used without
caution because it is possible that respondents may align themselves without
knowledge of how to use ideology in making vote choices. Furthermore,
respondents may also place themselves at the same point on the scale using
different information about what it means to be conservative or liberal.
Nevertheless, scholars who use this measure have shown that ideology has an
impact on issue position and vote choice. Furthermore, the liberal-conservative
continuum continues to be the dominant conceptualization in American politics
that is easily recognized by respondents.
According to Knight, (1981), previous assessments of the public’s
ideological thinking “were simply too restrictive” (833). While previous research
seems to require high levels of conceptualization and constraint in the electorate,
this research eases this expectation and views ideology as “some product of policy
preferences or issue opinions” (Knight, 1999:60-62). It seems best to view
ideology from the same lens as partisanship, “as a perceptual screen or filtering
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device which requires little in the way of sophistication” (Knight:833). This work
also chooses to follow the course of Jacoby (1995) whose notion of ideological is
not bipolar. He argues:
Ideological thinking is not a dichotomous characteristic, such that people
do or do not think about politics in ideological terms. Instead, ideological
thinking is best viewed in continuous terms; that is, there are many
gradations among individuals’ abilities to apply the liberal-conservative
continuum to specific political stimuli (314).

Utilizing this new approach to ideology, an emerging group of scholars decided to
re-focus attention on the popular use of ideological labels as opposed to the
individual's level of conceptualization and constraint. More specifically,
researchers put forth efforts to analyze “citizens’ direct application of the liberal
and conservative labels to themselves” (Levitin and Miller, 1979:752). The use of
this approach was not an attempt to by-pass the controversies surrounding
ideology in electoral behavior literature. Rather its primary aim was to provide a
new focus on the study of ideology in order to ascertain the exact role ideological
labels play in determining behavior.
While numerous studies have concluded that the mass public lacks any
type of ideological structuring, others have found, through the use of the selfidentification measure, that ideology has a significant impact on vote choice, and
thus had a significant impact on the outcome of several major elections (Stimson,
1975: Holm and Robinson, 1978: Levitin and Miller, 1979: Robinson and
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Fleishman, 1988). More specifically, a respondent’s use of ideological labels to
describe political objects, events, parties, and candidates plays an important role
in their voting behavior (Levitin and Miller, 1979).
To demonstrate the increased importance of ideology to the public,
Stimson (1975), using 1972 American National Election Study data, asked
respondents to place themselves on issue dimension scales and a liberalconservative scale. The relationship between ideology and vote choice was strong
and consistent for those voters in which the liberal-conservative continuum was
meaningful. Additionally, he concluded that at least half of the electorate
displayed belief structuring in line with that of Converse, suggesting that they:

Show evidence of using the left-right dimension in a manner which is
sufficiently abstract to encompass a wide scope of more specific political
attitudes, and which is demonstrably important in predicting their
responses to choices offered by the political system (414).

Other research attempting to document the importance of ideology include
Holm and Robinson (1978) and Levitin and Miller (1979). In an effort to refute
assumptions rampant in the literature about the “end of ideology,” these studies
find that ideological self-identification had significant predictive power in
determining vote choice for the 1972 election. Comparing ideology and party
identification’s predictive power, they concluded that the former was second in
importance to the latter. And for independents, ideology was a stronger predictor
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of vote choice than party identification. In addition to those findings, they
concluded that younger and more educated respondents utilized ideology more
because of their rejection of party identification.
Using the self-identification approach to ideology, Levitin and Miller,
(1979) found evidence that the public was capable of using the terms liberal and
conservative. For the first time, a combined measure of ideology was developed
where respondents were questioned about their own individual perceptions of the
terms liberal and conservative which included responses to the 7-point
identification scale as well as a question concerning group closeness.
Respondents were asked to identify the groups they felt close to and groups that
had similar ideas and beliefs as theirs. Specifically, they were asked if they felt
close to either liberals or conservatives. And finally, respondents were asked to
rate liberals and conservatives on a feeling thermometer.
In a detailed examination of the relationship between ideological selfplacement, vote preferences, and the citizens’ application of the ideological labels
to parties, candidates, and issues, Levitin and Miller came to several surprising
conclusions. In a normal vote analysis of the 1972 and 1976 elections evaluating
the direct role of ideological location apart from partisanship, the authors
concluded that ideological concerns “made a separate and significant contribution
to the vote decision in both 1972 and 1976” (757). They also document a strong
relationship between respondents’ placement on the 7-point scale and their
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perception of where their party and its presidential candidate are on the scale.
More simply, Democrats were consistently more likely than Independents and
Republicans to locate their party and their party’s candidate closer to their own
ideological identification than the Republican party and vice versa. They also
found that ideological location provides an independent point from which citizens
view politics and it is relatively stable. The authors concluded, “ideological
position is not simply a summary statement of issue positions,” it has many
meanings (769). One of which that has importance is that “ideological location is
an important factor in shaping voters choices on Election Day” (Holm and
Robinson, 1978:769). In short, ideological labels are powerful, political symbols
to many members of the public (Conover and Feldman, 1981).
Another body of research that supports the use of the self-identification
measure of ideology follows Jacoby (1995), whose conceptualization of
ideological thinking is based on a continuum. Jacoby shows that people have
different levels of ideological thinking, rather it be on the high or low end of
ideological sophistication, but people consistently choose the candidate that is
closest to their own views. Politically sophisticated voters have the cognitive
ability to organize their issue positions consistently (Jacoby, 1986). However,
even those who are unable to organize their beliefs along this continuum can still
utilize ideology, “as long as ideology is framed not as a set of issues constrained
by some underlying philosophical thread but instead is cast in symbolic or group
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identification terms” (Lyons and Scheb, 1992:583). In sum, even voters who are
not politically sophisticated are capable of utilizing ideology when they vote, even
if it only plays a role in candidate evaluation.
In short, as it has been demonstrated, all measurement tools of ideology
have limitations. The level of conceptualization and constraint approaches are
bipolar in that either an individual possess an ideology and is capable of
articulating that ideology, or they do not possess one, thereby resulting in the
respondent being classified as having a non-attitude (Converse, 1970). The selfidentification approach runs the risk of respondents using the terms without
knowledge of how they would define the terms. Nevertheless, this latter
measurement, self-identification, allows some flexibility and focuses on how
ideological labels are utilized by the electorate to understand the political world.
It thus assumes that individuals who successfully place themselves onto the 7point ideological scale have some level of ideological thinking and are capable of
utilizing that placement in making political decisions. Therefore, keeping these
things in mind, this research is primarily interested in the self-identification and
constraint approaches to studying ideology. The self-identification measure will
allow us to identify the respondent’s ideology, and the notion of constraint will
allow us to identify issue positions the respondent should have given knowledge
of their self-identification.
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Ideological Trends in the General Electorate
Numerous scholars have concluded that ideological labels have significant impact
on voting behavior. More specifically, they state that even voters who may not be
politically sophisticated are still capable of utilizing ideology even if it only plays
a role in candidate evaluation (Lyons and Scheb, 1992). They also argue that
ideological position has political significance. In sum, ideology continues to be a
significant predictor of voting behavior (Robinson and Fleishman, 1984).
Part of the importance placed upon the study of ideology derives from its
affect on realignment. The public’s political beliefs are communicated through
their ideological identification at the polls. Election results are thus analyzed as
communicating whether the public is moving to the left or to the right. As
previously discussed, liberals are more likely to support Democrats, and
Republicans are often the choice of conservatives. If the electorate shifts
ideologically, that change could affect partisan identification and vote choice.
Consequently, the party that is in the majority can become the minority party. In
his discussion of the role of partisan identification and ideology on political
behavior, Robinson (1984) states that ideology does a better job of describing the
public’s political beliefs than partisanship does. He goes on to argue that
ideology, partisanship, and issues are “so intricately interconnected” that it is hard
to determine which has more impact. Thus political scientists should examine the
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ideological preferences of voters in the same manner that partisan affiliations are
studied.
If Schlesinger’s cyclical theory is correct, eras of public and private
interest should be linked to the American electorate’s ideological identification
and issue preferences. Are they? The research is inconclusive. Since 1979, there
has been a shift in voter attitudes toward conservatism but there is question as to
whether this has lead to a general realignment of the electorate. For example,
Robinson, (1984) examines issues positions of the electorate during the 1970s and
early 1980s and finds evidence of a conservative trend. During that time period,
more Americans took conservative stances on a variety of issues. They were
more opposed to abortion, the abolition of the death penalty, government
spending on social programs, homosexual rights, and racial integration. But in an
analysis of national survey data, Robinson fails to document this trend. Table 2-1
displays the results of his analysis.
The data from Table 2-1 is inconclusive. While it does demonstrate major
decreases in liberal identification in the electorate, it fails to provide ample
evidence of a general conservative trend. The largest increase in conservative
ideological identification is a five- percent increase from 30% in 1974 to 35% in
1983. The Gallup Poll actually reveals a decrease in conservative identification
from 46% in 1970 to 44% in 1981. Moreover, if these data were analyzed from
year to year, it would be difficult to identify this slight conservative trend.
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Robinson concludes that the American electorate has perhaps moved to the right,
but not much.
Robinson and Fleishman (1984) come to different conclusions using
several national surveys. In an examination of the Gallup Poll, they found an
increase in the number of conservatives between 1938 and 1973. Although there
were larger proportions of liberals than conservatives until 1964, by 1970, selfidentified conservatives outnumbered liberals by more than 64%. They also
found that other national surveys such as the General Social Survey and the Roper
organization reflect general conservative trends in the electorate. Further research
by Miller (1992) finds similar results among the young. He finds that the
proportion of young identifying themselves as conservatives, increased from
17.8% in 1974 to 30.7% in 1986. More recently, Knight and Erikson, (1999) also
found an increase in conservative identification. Utilizing data from the National
Election Study from 1972 to 1994, they concluded that, “Since at least the early
1970s more voters call themselves conservative than liberal. And this tendency
has clearly been growing” (Norrander and Wilcox:99).
This increasing conservative identification, however, did not affect the
electorate’s issue positions, which remained liberal during this entire period.
Smith (1990) reaches this conclusion in his study of the electorate since World
War II. In an analysis of 455 issues from several different survey organizations,
he finds no general conservative trend in attitudes. In fact, during the same years
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Robinson and Fleishman (1984) document a conservative trend in identification,
Smith documents liberal growth. Robinson and Fleishman (1984) also document
a move towards liberalism on certain issues such as support for increased funding
on domestic problems, the environment, education, and welfare services. In sum,
there is a difference between ideology and issue position. In the general
electorate, an increase in conservative identification does not necessarily reflect
adoption of a conservative position on issues.
Conclusion
Although scholars have learned a great deal about ideology and the electorate’s
level of political sophistication, there is a tremendous gap in this literature.
Specifically the research totally ignores the impact ideology and what impact it
has African-Americans’ political behavior. It also fails to analyze ideological
trends among Blacks and what impact a “left” or “right” trend could possibly
have on realignments. This research seeks to fill that gap.
In general, studies of ideology continue to raise more questions than they
answer because there continues to be intense disagreement over the role of
ideology. While the early scholars who examined ideology concluded that the
mass public was politically unsophisticated, later scholars have found that
ideology does indeed play some role in determining political behavior. If we
were to view the debate concerning ideology from the same lens as Stimson,
(1975), we find that both camps tend to look for different things in their research,
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and both tend to interpret the same facts differently. For example, earlier studies
attempted to spell out what a belief system is. They hypothesized that an
ideology would look like a single powerful underlying dimension. This is based
on several premises. These scholars believed that the belief structures that elites
utilized could also be the basis upon which respondent’s belief consistency is
measured. Their research is based on the elite’s belief system against which the
mass public is found lacking. The second set of scholars looked for belief
structuring first, or rather the evidence of a belief system. They asserted that the
electorate has the ability for rational choice. Using deductive reasoning, they
started with models and make inferences as to what the electorate would look like
if the model fit. Their primary focus was to look for rationality first and the
evidence of a belief system second. Thus the debate is whether the ideological
glass is half empty or half full. In short, scholars state that the “conclusion must
be a middle of the road one: there has been a substantial change in the way the
public conceptualizes politics, yet there is evidence for inertia as well” (Nie et al.,
176:122).
However, my view of ideology and the electorate is more optimistic.
Although numerous scholars have concluded that the electorate is nonideologically oriented in its political thinking, political scientists as well as
political commentators continue to measure the ideological identification of the
general electorate. Furthermore, they have shown that it is irrelevant whether the
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electorate is fully capable of defining the terms “liberal” and “conservative”
because regardless of differing definitions, the terms still have significance in
determining political behavior.
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CHAPTER III
BLACK CONSERVATISM

Most of the research on conservatism in America largely ignores the existence of
a Black conservative group. Moreover, current discussions about Black
conservatism lack historical perspective. They assume that conservatism in the
African-American community is a new phenomenon. However, this assumption
ignores a large literature that discusses the history of African-Americans and the
political thought of major Black intellectuals. This research seeks to fill the gaps
left by previous research. It will briefly discuss the history of conservatism in
America and will trace the development of Black conservative political thought.
Conservatism in America
Black conservatism cannot be understood as an isolated movement in the AfricanAmerican community. It must be understood within the context of the history of
conservatism in American. In the early twentieth century, America evolved from
a conservative tradition rooted in 18th century political thought. This is when
Black conservatives’ political views became popular. Thus, before one is capable
of fully understanding the arguments of Black conservatives, one must examine
the historical development of conservatism in America.
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In general, conservatism in America can best be understood from three
different perspectives: anti-statist, organic, and neoconservative (Randolph,
1995). Anti-statist thought originated in 18th century Manchester. Proponents of
this school of thought oppose expanding the role of the state. More specifically,
anti-statist thought comprises these ideas:
(1) it places greater emphasis on the role of the individual (i.e., unlimited
individual freedom); (2) it supports strict limits on governmental
authority; (3) it advocates a very narrow role of government in the market
place; (4) it adamantly opposes communism and socialism; (5) it opposes
the welfare state in its present form; and finally, although most anti-statist
oppose the use of quotas, they do support moderate forms of affirmative
action programs such as set-asides, and minority hiring preferences to
promote diversity (150).
In terms of contemporary politics, anti-statists represent the “establishment” or
the moderate wing of the Republican Party. They usually control the White
House as well as the party’s national candidates. In relation to Black
conservatives, prior to the 1980s many Black elites who identified with the
Republican Party were aligned with this sub-group of conservatives.
Organics represent the second perspective of conservatism in America.
They are primarily “concerned more with social and cultural dimensions of life,
that is with the moral values and religious or ethical spirit that suffuse the social
order and give meaning to life” (Randolph, 150). They are extremely
conservative and are heavily influenced by religion. In the United States, these
conservatives are often characterized as the “New Right” or the “Religious Far
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Right.” They are against affirmative action, gun control, the welfare state,
abortion, and busing. Moreover, members of this camp such as Senator Jesse
Helms (NC) have worked adamantly to weaken the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The organic conservatives have given tremendous
financial and political support to Black conservatives.
Neoconservatists are primarily composed of ex-liberals, original
proponents of the Great Society programs, ex-Black power advocates, and former
socialists. Generally, neoconservatives support traditional family values, selfhelp programs, and vouchers for education. They are mainly against set-aside
programs for minorities and an expanded role for the government. Black
conservatives who identify with this group usually agree with neoconservatists on
matters surrounding self-help and education.
Generally, organics and anti-statists are the dominant sub-groups of
conservatives in the United Sates. Therefore, this paper will focus on the
development of these two camps among Black conservatives.
Origins of Black Conservatives
It is difficult to trace the development of Black conservatism to African culture.
Walton (1969) states:
It is true that Blacks were also aware of an aristocratic tradition in their
African Kingdoms. But the impact of this feudal structure upon their
thinking is not known nor is the degree of this aristocracy among the
different Blacks brought to America known. In other words, the number
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of Black aristocrats and Blacks with aristocratic thinking that survived the
“middle passage” and made it to America is unknown. Moreover, the
influence of this group upon Black thinking is also unknown. Thus, for all
intent and purposes then Black conservatism emerged on the American
continent (151).

Most Black writers conclude that conservatism in the African-American
community is largely a result of slavery and racism (Randolph, 1995). Black
conservatism arose from the different types of living situations experienced by
free Blacks and slaves. While slaves were working in the abolition movement,
free Blacks were able to acquire property, education, and wealth. Over time, the
small number of Blacks who were free began to increase their wealth and emulate
the aristocratic ideas of Whites. This created an even larger gulf between freed
Blacks and slaves. The harsh realities of slavery and racism left free Blacks with
no alternative but to favor the status quo conservatism. This allowed them to
keep their positions (Hwang, Fitzpatrick, & Helms, 1998). These class cleavages
not only existed during slavery but they have been perpetuated throughout history.
Many scholars have documented the distinctions between these two groups of
Blacks, arguing that throughout history there has always been a large gulf
between the Black middle class and the larger masses of the poor. “Every study
that has looked closely at the Black community has found a gulf between the
Black middle classes and the mass of impoverished Black citizens. This was true
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in antebellum times at the turn of the century, in the New Deal, World War II
period in the postwar era and through the 1960’s” (Welch & Foster, 1987: 447).
Black Conservatism Defined
Defining Black conservatism is difficult. For clarification purposes, when a
reference made to Black conservatism, Black conservative intellectuals are the
subjects, not the masses of African-Americans in the electorate that may consider
themselves as conservative. Like the views of other groups, the views of Black
conservatives are not monolithic. Any definition of Black conservatism will face
two limitations. First, it will not be true of all Black conservatives. Second, it
will be true of many who are not Black conservatives (Eisenstadt, 1999).
Although it is difficult to define Black conservatism, its basic tenets can
be identified. First, Black conservatives show great respect for Western
civilization, its culture, and its institutions. Most Black conservatives believe that
through their own resources African-Americans can succeed in American society.
Individual achievement, not government assistance, is seen as the key to success.
Black conservatives also believe that Western institutions provide all Americans
with an equal chance for success. A major argument of Black conservatives can
be summarized by the following statement, “If we play by your rules and prove
our worthiness according to your standards, you will have no choice but to
accommodate to us” (Eisenstadt, 1999:xi). Black conservatives believe that no
matter how Whites attempted to block African-Americans from full participation
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in the American system, their efforts to prevent full participation will be defeated
by the universality of those systems. Commonly referred to as
“civilizationalism,” this belief has been central to Black political thought.
Black conservative intellectuals also have a deep appreciation for
capitalism, often at the expense of direct participation in the political system.
Capitalism is seen as an advantageous tool for African-Americans because it
gives everyone who can master its ways an equal opportunity for success. This is
evident through Black entrepreneurs such as Martin Delany and Earl Graves. It is
also demonstrated by the number of Black-owned business in America before the
Civil War. For instance, during the 1820s and 1830s, Blacks flourished in such
businesses as real estate, construction, manufacturing and transportation. The
success in these businesses was evident by the fact that many Black businesses
employed White Americans. For example, Black conservative James Forten, a
Philadelphia abolitionist and entrepreneur, was a living example of the
possibilities business success could bring to Blacks. He was a strong defender of
economic success for African-Americans. Similarly, Stephen Smith, a successful
lumber merchant, had annual sales of over $100,000 by the mid-nineteenth
century. Prosperity in a capitalistic market, according to Black conservatives,
depends not on personal connections or one’s inherited position, but the
individual’s innate talent. In fact, research shows that enslaved Blacks in the
south took advantage of free enterprise. Records indicate that slaves were able to
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hire other slaves from their master and some slaves were able to purchase their
freedom. Although capitalism has been viewed negatively by some AfricanAmericans, Black conservatives still believe that “collective self-advancement”
through capitalism is a lasting strategy of success for the race.
Also within the strains of conservatism that Black intellectuals posit is the
presence of the so-called “Protestant Work Ethic.” Jupiter Hammon, said to be
the founding figure of Black conservatism, was a Long Island slave and a literary
figure. His literary work emphasized the importance of respectability, humility,
morality, Christianity, and deference towards authority. Conservatives in the
Black community believed that Free Blacks had a responsibility to set examples
for others by upholding high moral standards. This included proving themselves
worthy of freedom, the avoidance of laziness and stealing, and dispelling myths
about Black incapacity and undirected lives.
Black conservatives are optimistic and choose to focus on Black
accomplishments in the face of obstacles rather than on the problems of slavery
and racism. To those who argue that African-Americans have more to achieve,
Black conservatives say that much has already been achieved. For many Black
conservatives, there was a pride in accomplishment and a respect for mutual
cooperation with Whites for the advancements of the race.
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Contemporary Black Conservatism
Among the leading Black conservatives today are Thomas Sowell, Walter
Williams, Glen Loury, and Clarence Thomas (Singer, 1981:West, 1987). The
Black conservatives’ aim is to “undermine the position of Black liberals and
replace them with Black Republicans (or even conservative Black Democrats),
who downplay governmental regulation and stress market mechanisms and
success-oriented values in Black communities” (West. 1987:82). Black
conservatives also express the sentiment that ideas offered by liberals are “played
out,” because they have not solved the problems of the Black community. Black
conservatives say that they provide a new way to look at old problems with new
solutions. According to Toler (1993), Black conservatism rests upon five points:

1) Although lingering racism still exists, thanks to the victories of the civil
rights struggles, racial discrimination is no longer a critical obstacle to
Black progress. We can speak of a racist American past, but not of a
racist contemporary America.
2) African American demands for equal opportunity made during the Civil
Rights era now go too far in demanding equal outcomes. A nondiscriminatory America does not ensure equal outcomes. Capitalism
maximizes skill and talent and any differences among ethnic groups, or
between genders, is a function of each group’s particular strengths and
weaknesses.
3) Today’s problems of race relations and Black poverty cannot be
remedied by government policy alone. The roots of today’s problems are
located first and foremost within African Americans: in our inability to
successfully compete in a free market system, in the poor values and
irresponsible and offensive behavior of poor Blacks, in our psychological
hang-ups about group identity and past victimization, and/or in our failure
to take full advantage of existing opportunities. In this light, not only are
government social welfare and legal remedies, such as affirmative action
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programs, unnecessary, they are detrimental to the development of Black
people. Social welfare programs destroy Black families, foster
debilitating dependency, and reward irresponsible behavior.
4) Affirmative action programs lower Black self-esteem since Whites will
always diminish Black accomplishment as reflecting only affirmative
action imperatives and Black beneficiaries of affirmative action programs
can never be fully confident that their success stems from their talent.
These programs are also detrimental to Blacks because of the White
(male) resentment they engender. Affirmative action has, in any case,
only benefited more advantaged Blacks.
5) The appropriate strategy for African Americans is one focusing on selfhelp. First we need to de-emphasize racial identity and loyalty in favor of
an American identity. Second, African Americans should compete on the
basis of merit only. Third, we need to de-emphasize government
programs and civil rights legislation in favor of racial self-help. Blacks
need to focus on Black entrepreneurship, building and supporting Black
business, particularly in poor Black neighborhoods. And most important,
the Black middle-class needs to teach poor African Americans appropriate
values and behavior (5-6).

Generally speaking, in addition the views listed above, Black
conservatives oppose federal intervention into the lives of African-Americans.
Conservatives are less confident than liberals in the ability of human beings to be
rational. Therefore they place their faith in the economic marketplace. Karenga
(1986) states that contemporary Black conservatives subscribe to the “minimal
state whose principal business is protection, securing contracts, and above all nonintervention in the lives of good, property-holding citizens” (44).
A common thread found among contemporary Black conservatives is a
demand for high moral standards and centrality of character. Central to their
argument is that racism is not the only thing to blame for problems in the Black
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community. Black economist Glenn Loury argues that the problem of the Black
poor is a moral one. He states that Black leadership and the Black middle-class
refuse to confront the “enemy within” because they ignore the pathological
culture of the Black poor (Barker, Jones, and Tate, 1999). This pathological
culture exhibits a lack of concern for values such as self-reliance and delayed
gratification and results in high crime rates, unwed mothers, and poor academic
performance of Black youth. Loury believes that the moral decay of Black
communities is beyond the reach of government programs. Black conservatives
believe that government social welfare programs have created a sense of
dependency. This sense of dependency has created a major problem facing the
Black community. It decreases the importance of the solidity of the family and
self-reliance. Black conservatives also believe that government programs such as
the New Deal and Great Society programs whose objective was to fight the “War
on Poverty” have largely failed. They note the increase in illegitimacy (out of
wed lock births) and crime rates in the Black community as well as the failure of
many Black businesses. This view of the Black conservative intellectual is often
used to attack affirmative action, set asides, and other tools of federal government
intervention. Black conservatives argue that these programs are no longer needed
because race is not as serious an obstacle to the attainment of education and
employment.
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Major policy programs advanced by contemporary Black conservatives
include educational and employment reforms (Barker et al., 1999). Black
conservatives believe that the economic inequality that African-Americans
experience is a result of substandard schools. A solution to the problem of
education is a free-market system whereby assistance is given to needy students
through the use of vouchers so that they can attend schools of their own choosing.
Because of competition, the argument goes, substandard schools would either be
forced to improve their quality or shut down.
Other policy alternatives of Black conservatives are the imposition of a
sub-minimum wage to enhance the position of Black youth in today’s labor
market. Black conservatives believe that the passage of minimum wage
legislation denies Black youth opportunities for employment because it overprices
labor. This denial of employment carries over into other social problems in the
Black community. They stress that if Black youth were afforded the opportunity
for gainful employment, they could gain valuable work experience that would
make them marketable in the future.
The Development of Black Conservatism
There are four distinct eras in American history that can explain the emergence
and continuation of Black conservatism: Post-Reconstruction (1890s-1930s), the
New Deal Era (1930s-1950s), the Civil Rights Era (1950s-1960s), and the Post-
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Civil Rights Era (1970s-present). Black conservatism is not a new phenomenon.
It was prevalent during both the Post-Reconstruction Era and the New Deal Era.
The Post-Reconstruction Era, which is often called the “Age of the
Conservative,” saw the emergence of several notable Black conservatives such as
Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey as spokespersons for Black
Americans. Whites saw Washington as a “model Negro” who believed that
Blacks would eventually “be accorded ‘all the political rights’ to which their
‘ability, character, and material possession’ entitled them” (Suggs, 1999:82). In
line with the Black conservative political thought, Washington emphasized selfhelp and entrepreneurship for Blacks. This is evident in the establishment of the
Negro Organization Society and the National Negro Business League, both of
which he founded in the early 1900s. Both of these organizations sought to
improve living conditions of African Americans through self-help programs. He
also favored incremental as opposed to radical change to the race problem.
Marcus Garvey, the leader of the Universal Negro Improvement
Association, was also an important leader at this time. His organization’s
platform openly listed issues that were central to Black conservative thought.
Although most scholars would not classify Garvey as a conservative, his
underlying social conservatism is evident if one examines his movement, which
had an underlying emphasis on business enterprise. In an effort to take advantage
of the free market system, Garvey established the Negro Factories Corporation in
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1919, which was set up to manufacture every marketable commodity. The
corporation developed grocery stores, a hotel, a printing press and a restaurant.
Garvey held fast to the beliefs of Washington, whom Garvey viewed as his
mentor. Garvey acknowledged that although circumstances handicapped Blacks,
society is not keeping Blacks from progress. Garvey was also in agreement with
Washington on ideas regarding self-help, the importance of religion, and selfsufficiency.
The Post-Reconstruction Era is best characterized by “the reconciliation
and reunion of North and South” which was plagued with violence against Blacks
and White supremacy (Randolph, 1995:152). John Mitchell’s statement in the
Richmond Planet described how Blacks felt about government action for
protection, they believed “it is useless to look to the President of the United
States, Congress, or the Supreme Court of the country for the betterment of our
condition” (Randolph, 1995:152). Knowing that they lacked protection from the
federal government, Blacks, especially the middle class, sought to forge political
alliances with White conservatives for protection during reconstruction. As a
result of their subservient relationship to Whites, their societal statuses were
protected and they were afforded spoils under the new system of segregation. For
example, conservative Blacks were appointed to high positions in education as
principals of Black public schools and as presidents of Black state colleges.
Blacks who went against Washington’s leadership during this time were subject
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“to feel the full weight of the Tuskegee Machine,” an elite group of Black
aristocrats who counted on Washington for jobs (Randolph, 1995:153).
Black conservatism declined by the end of the Post-Reconstruction Era.
Several major events contributed to this decline. They included the Harlem
Renaissance, the African-American shift to the Democratic Party, the Civil Rights
Movement, and the transfer of power from the states to the federal government.
The rise in liberal integrationist ideologies also help to undermine the support of
conservatism in the Black community. As a result, two distinct camps emerged in
Black politics: the liberal camp, which supported full integration and equal rights;
and the conservative camp, which favored cautious incrementalism. W. E. B. Du
Bois, Monroe Trotter, and Frederick Douglass represented the liberal camp, while
Booker T. Washington represented the conservative camp.
The New Deal Era is characterized by the realignment of Blacks to the
Democratic Party. For some time, Blacks had been loyal to the party of Lincoln
because of the party’s performance during the Civil War. After time, however,
the Republican Party began to lose Blacks when Herbert Hoover publicly
endorsed it as being the “lily white” party of the south. Nonetheless, Black
conservatives continued to support Republican candidates, but they also showed
little willingness to identify with Republicans as a party. Black support continued
for the party in part due to the lack of involvement of Blacks in state and local
Democratic parties. In most places, state law described party machines as private
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organizations for Whites only. In addition, southern Democrats were very hostile
toward Black membership in the party. Therefore, Blacks continued to identify
with the anti-statist wing of the Republican Party (Randolph, 1995).
It was not until the Democratic Party politicized Blacks during the New
Deal that Blacks realigned to the Democratic Party. However, full integration did
not occur because Blacks were still unable to get involved in local parties. The
few Blacks that did realign identified with the national party. As a result,
conservatism survived.
The influence of Black conservatives declined even further during the
Civil Rights Era. The hostility directed toward Blacks in general and the moral
and religious convictions of the movement, along with the support of White
America silenced Blacks who were opposed to the Civil Rights Movement.
Moreover, Blacks who had attempted to join the Dixiecrat Party were shunned
socially and economically, which meant that middle-class Black business owners
who espoused their conservative views lost customers. Conservatism declined
even further during the Civil Rights Movement because of differences within the
Republican Party. Barry Goldwater, who voted against the Civil Right’s Act of
1964 and his nomination as the Republican presidential candidate manifested
these differences. He was also vocal in his defense of state’s rights and his
opposition to integration. Few Black Republicans remained supportive of the
party.
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Although Black conservatism declined during this era, it survived through
the voice of George Schuyler, an influential Black journalist. Schuyler, a figure
of the Harlem Renaissance, was characterized in his early years as a quirky
liberal. However, Schuyler was drawn towards conservatism because he became
disenchanted with socialism. Not only does his autobiography serve as a
verification of his conservative political thought, but Schuyler contributed
significantly to prominent conservative magazines including the National Review.
While Black liberals sought full equality and integration during this era, Schuyler
argued that cautious incrementalism was the best possible way to achieve lasting
racial harmony. Schuyler was enraged by the Civil Right Movement. He
believed it focused too much on Black failures and not enough on the success of
the Black middle class. For example, the liberalism that inspired AfricanAmerican aspiration for integration was premised upon the notion that the lives of
Blacks had suffered because of separation and alienation.
During the Civil Rights Era, different types of conservatives controlled the
national Republican Party and the local parties. The national party was controlled
by the anti-statists while the organic conservatives controlled local parties. The
national party was more moderate and more supportive of civil rights than state
parties. As a result, many Black conservatives found themselves often having to
support the Democratic presidential candidate because the national Republican
Party was opposed to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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The arguments of Schuyler and other Black conservatives fell mostly on
deaf ears between the 1950s and 1960s. It is this absence from political discourse,
which makes the reappearance of conservatism in the African-American
community so noteworthy. During the Post-Civil Rights Era, Black conservatives
experienced resurgence. While most Black moderates supported the decisions
during the Civil Rights Movement, to grant Blacks equal rights, Black
conservatives were skeptical of federal encroachment on state powers and
decisions by of the Warren Court. Again, Black conservatives’ support in the
African-American community was dense with somewhere between ninety-five
and ninety-nine percent of African-Americans rejecting the conservative
candidate for president, Barry Goldwater and supporting the Democrat, Lyndon
Johnson (Eisenstadt, 1999).
However, the continued negative portrayal of African-Americans by the
liberal establishment made Black conservatives who had been silent uneasy. For
instance, the pathologizing of Black culture by liberals reached its peak with the
publication of the Moynihan Report in 1965. This report emphasized that the
major cause of poverty was the breakdown of the family structure. Despite the
fact that the Moynihan Report was described by many as fatuous, Black
conservatives were compelled to speak. In particular, Schuyler, in his 1966
autobiography referred to liberal pathologizing as the “culture of poverty” school
of sociology (Eisenstadt, 1999:xxiv). Schuyler was not the only one who opposed
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Black liberalism. Others included Ralph Ellison, Albert Murray and Joseph
Jackson.
During this time however, Black support for the Republican Party
remained minimal. Despite failed efforts by the party to recruit Blacks, the gulf
between voting behavior and party identification was maintained (Ashbee, 1999).
The number of Blacks who described themselves as conservative was negligible.
This was of secondary importance to some Republicans because they were
attempting to win the votes of southern Whites.
However, President Richard Nixon had several Blacks in his
administration, each of whom were Republicans. He attempted to recoup the
efforts to lure Blacks back to the party. They focused on wealth creation and the
development on Black capitalism civil rights were given secondary importance.
Under Nixon’s administration, the Office of Minority Business Enterprise
(OMBE) was established to assist Black Republicans in accomplishing their
goals.
Despite consistent problems, the Republican Party received increased
support from the general electorate in the 1980s. The newfound prominence of
the Republican Party came with little or no support from African-Americans
despite several failed recruiting efforts. Some Republicans however, regarded the
loss of the Black vote as a weakness and sought to change it. They noted that the
Republicans had to win 20 percent of the Black vote to become the dominant
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party (Ashbee, 1999). Republican National Committee Chairman Lee Atwater
echoed this sentiment by stating that “making Black voters welcome in the
Republican Party” was a priority (236). He stated that the lack of Blacks in the
party could eventually harm their base support. The Republican Party also
believed that if they did not recruit African-Americans they would be viewed as
racist. In short, Black support for the Republican Party became a moral
imperative.
With this in mind, several organizations were formed to rebuild
Republicanism in the Black community. The Heritage Groups Division was
founded to focus on minority issues. The National Black Republican Council and
the Council of Concerned Afro-American Republicans all made special attempts
to win back Black support for the Republican Party. Still later, a Black owned
consulting firm was hired to assist in these efforts, which proved successful. The
rise of the New Right as well as the party’s previous failures to reach Black
constituencies all led to the emergence of Black conservatives. Not only had a
prominent Black conservative, Thomas Sowell, been prepared to take the
education secretary post in the Reagan administration but a conference of Black
dissidents was also held. Organized by Edwin Meese, leader of Reagan’s
transition team, it served as a conduit for Blacks who were sympathetic to
Reagan’s goals.
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With visibility and Republican support, Black conservatives were
rewarded for their patronage. They attained positions in the White House and
many were more willing to publicly espouse their views and beliefs. As a result,
they became prominent and their views were heard widely in the media. At this
time, political scholars and commentators began to speak in terms of a Black
conservative movement. They point to Clarence Thomas, Glen Loury, and Walter
Williams who all became increasingly visible in the past two decades. The
appointment of Clarence Thomas to the United States Supreme Court gave Black
conservatives legitimacy. Shortly after the appointment in 1991, Black
conservative Republicans flourished. In 1990, there were 12 Black Republican
nominees for the House of Representatives, by 1994 it had risen to 28. Gary
Franks of Connecticut and J.C. Watts of Oklahoma are examples of this growth.
They were the first Black Republicans elected to Congress since 1978.
Though there were Black conservatives that aligned with the Republican
Party, most African-Americans did not join the Republicans. Furthermore, some
scholars suggest that Black conservatives that have defected to the Republican
Party are often disappointed because in actuality, Blacks who call themselves
conservative are actually moderates. There are also questions about the
increasing prominence of Black conservatives because of the failure of the
Republican Party to recoup Black support. As Ashbee (1999) notes: “both the
Reagan and Bush administrations and successive party leaders proved largely
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unresponsive to the politics of Black conservatism” (244). Thus, the big
questions remain, are these Black conservative intellectuals truly conservative?
And do they have a following in the general Black community?
Ideological Trends among African-Americans
Some of the strongest voices in Black political discourse include the voices of
major Black conservatives such as Clarence Thomas, Thomas Sowell, Shelby
Steele, Armstrong Williams and Ward Connerly. Scholars such as Cornell West
state that these Black conservatives do not have true ties in the Black community.
Instead, they have been promoted by their White counterparts and have no true
Black support. This is evident by the unsuccessful election bids of major Black
conservative candidates. For example, Alan Keyes, rarely obtains public support
from Black conservatives in his bid for the presidency and there have only been
two Black Republicans elected to Congress since the end of World War II and
both were elected from primarily White districts (Eisendstadt, 1999).
Moreover, there seems to be discontent among Black conservatives in the
Republican Party. They are displeased with the fact that certain segments of the
Republican Party ignores their views. Instead, they state that the party attempts to
cozy up with Jesse Jackson and other liberal Blacks who will never support their
views and they ignore talented conservatives who have supported them.
Additionally, Republican Party officials and their Black auxiliary organizations
are reluctant to endorse Black conservatism. These Black auxiliary organizations
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choose to support a moderated message that is more often than not associated
with liberalism. Thus, the so-called Black conservatism may not actually be
conservative and may not have a voice among African-Americans or in the
Republican Party.
Many scholars have speculated that middle and upper class AfricanAmericans are becoming conservative. Researchers believed that the growing
economic gulf in the African-American community would result in attitudinal
differences (Welch & Combs, 1985). This is an expectation because we know
that higher income people tend to be more conservative and are less likely to
believe that the government should be involved in funding domestic welfare
issues (Welch and Foster, 1987). The growing problems of poverty that persist
after years of government programs, and increasing number of Blacks are
wondering if the Democratic Party’s solution with government programs have
been counterproductive and ineffective (Gaiter, 1991). Furthermore, some Black
voters believe that the solutions of the past simply no longer work in the AfricanAmerican community (Reiland, 1996). Although Blacks continue to support the
Democratic Party nearly unanimously, a large number of them are looking beyond
the party for alternative solutions.
However, few scholars have examined the presence of conservatism in the
African-American community. This phenomenon challenges the assumption that
African-American’s political attitudes are homogenous. The homogeneity of
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African-American political behavior is evident from the fact that AfricanAmericans nearly unanimously vote for Democratic presidential candidates.
Researchers who do attempt to document this phenomenon come to similar
conclusions as researchers who examine trends produced in the general electorate.
They all produce conflicting and contradictory results.
Even as the general electorate became more conservative, AfricanAmericans remained overwhelmingly liberal (Welch & Combs, 1985: Seltzer &
Smith, 1985). Many scholars have concluded that there are very few AfricanAmerican conservatives. Despite the paucity of numbers, the media amplifies
their views. Some argue that these African-American conservatives fail to engage
in discourse with the African-American community and that this severely limits
their credibility (West, 1987). Others argue that Black conservatives will not be
able to mobilize support until they earn the trust and respect of the larger AfricanAmerican community. Gilliam (1986), for example, states that most AfricanAmericans were politically socialized during the Civil Rights Movement, an era
in which government intervention was necessary and thus do not identify with
conservatives. Black conservatives disagreed with every aspect of the Civil
Rights Movement. They criticized how the movement forced federal
encroachment on state powers and they were skeptical of the motives of liberals
who pathologized Black culture. Toler (1993) goes as far as to argue that the term
“African-American conservative” is an oxymoron. In sum, as West (1987) states,
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as most Blacks would agree with, “Black liberalism is indeed adequate, but Black
conservatism is unacceptable” (148).
Several sources suggest that African-Americans remain overwhelmingly
liberal. Today, for example, middle-class African-Americans are just as likely to
be liberal as lower-class African-Americans. Furthermore, college educated,
middle-class African-Americans are more liberal than lower class, uneducated
African-Americans, and African-Americans in the north are more liberal than
African-Americans in the south (Welch & Combs, 1985). Though Welch and
Foster (1987) argue that the African-American middle class is more conservative
in regards to affirmative action and social welfare, African-Americans as a group
are still more liberal than Caucasians at all income levels. In sum, many studies
suggest that there is no new African-American middle-class conservative group
(Seltzer & Smith, 1985; Welch & Combs, 1985; Welch & Foster, 1987).
To conclude, we are still uncertain as to whether African-Americans in
general have become more conservative. Unlike research that documents trends
in the general electorate, most scholars who focus on African-Americans have
merely looked at ideological identification and issue positions at one point in
time. Due to this limitation, definite conclusions cannot be drawn about ideology
among African-Americans. Welch & Combs (1985) state that “a longer time
period to measure change would be desirable. Up to now, however, there has
been no research on this question based on a national sample and looking at
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longitudinal changes” (96). This research is important because it is the first to
document trends in ideological identification over a period greater than 10 years.
Therefore, the first question I will address is: Have African-Americans become
more conservative over the last 25 years? And more importantly, do Black
conservatives have support in the African-American community?
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES

In this dissertation, ideological identification is examined in the electorate and
among African-Americans specifically. Analyses are also undertaken to examine
differences which may exist among African-Americans who identify themselves
as conservative and Caucasians who identify themselves as conservative. Data
are taken from the American National Election Study (NES) for the years 1972 to
1998 and the National Black Election Study (NBES) from 1984, 1988, and 1996.
Both surveys include several questions relating to ideology. Although the NES
typically contains only about 200 African-Americans, it is a number sufficient to
do general analysis. However, the NBES is also used to supplement the NES. It
is the only survey, which provides a large sample of African-Americans.
Several studies have utilized issue questions posed by the National
Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey to determine a respondent’s
ideology (Welch & Foster, 1987; Gilliam, 1986; Seltzer & Smith, 1985; Welch &
Combs, 1985). However, none of the studies that examine African-American
ideology over time have utilized data from the NES or NBES, which is highly
regarded (Norrander & Wilcox, 1997; Gant & Luttbeg, 1995; Abramson et. al,
1995; Lyons & Scheb, 1992; Jacoby, 1986; Nie & Anderson, 1974). Even though
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there are problems with this measure of ideology, Lyons and Scheb (1992)
conclude, “the liberal-conservative self-identification measure retains
considerable utility” (575).
Utilizing these data, several hypotheses are tested. First, we would expect
to find an increasing number of African-Americans identifying themselves as
conservative over the past 20 years. This hypothesis will be addressed by
utilizing the standard 7-point ideological identification scale used in the NES
since 1972. However, there was a slight variation in the question for the 1996
NES, which is demonstrated below. The question used to construct the scale
reads as follows:
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is
(1996NES:I’m going to show you) a 7-point scale on which the political
views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal (1) to
extremely conservative (7). Where would you place yourself on this scale,
or haven’t you thought much about this?
In order to provide a more complete analysis of trends, recoding was necessary.
Respondents in the NES who responded either extremely or slightly
conservative/liberal were collapsed into the “conservative” and “liberal” category.
The NBES of 1984, 1988, and 1996 will be used to examine AfricanAmerican ideological identification. Somewhat similar to the questions used in
the NES, the NBES uses the following questions to measure ideological
identification.
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In general, when it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as a
liberal, a conservative, a moderate, or what? (v.2100)
Do you think of yourself as a strong liberal/conservative or a not so strong
liberal/conservative? (v.2101)
Do you think of yourself as more like a liberal or more like a
conservative?(v.2102)
Although this question is different from the one used in the NES, it is the only one
where there is a large enough sample of African-Americans over time.
Respondents in the NBES who responded either “strong liberal/conservative,”
“not very strong liberal/conservative,” or “moderate slightly liberal/conservative”
were collapsed into the “conservative” and “liberal” category.
Other hypotheses are as follows: Black conservatives’ partisan
identification and electoral preferences are different from White conservatives.
There is an expectation that conservative African-Americans identify more with
the Democratic party and thus vote Democrat more than conservative Caucasians.
Several scholars note that a majority of African-Americans support the
Democratic Party. This hypothesis will be tested by crosstabulations of
ideological identification and partisan identification and ideological identification
and vote choice. The vote choice variable provided the respondent with the
following choices, Democrat, Republican or major third party candidate, and is
only applicable to presidential years. Questions used from the NES are as
follows:
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Partisan identification (v. 301): Generally speaking, do you usually think
of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (If
Republican or Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong (Rep?Dem) or
not very strong (Rep/Dem)?
Vote Choice (v. 704): (If r voted) Whom did you vote for?
Questions from the NBES are similar to those in the NES.
Partisan identification (v. 1047): Generally speaking, do you usually think
of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and independent, or what?
Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very
strong Republican/Democrat?
Vote Choice (v. 2068): (If r voted) Who did you vote for?
To provide a more complete analysis, recoding was necessary for both data sets.
Respondents who identified themselves as either “strong” or “not very strong
Democrat/Republican” were collapsed into the “Democrat” or “Republican”
category.
Before offering remaining hypotheses about conservatism, clarification is
necessary. For the purpose of this research, conservatism means someone who is
more likely than a liberal: (a) to oppose government spending on domestic
problems, such as healthcare, welfare, and other social services; (b) to give higher
ratings to public figures who espouse conservative views such as Newt Gingrich
and Colin Powell; (c) to oppose laws protecting homosexuals; (d) to favor the
death penalty. These hypotheses concern whether or not there are distinct and
visible differences between African-Americans who identify themselves as
conservatives and Caucasians who identify themselves as conservative.
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Liberal means that the respondent will call for more government
involvement in domestic issues, have lower ratings for conservative political
leaders, favor laws protecting homosexuals, and oppose the death penalty.
From this information, several hypotheses are formed. African-Americans
who identify themselves as conservative will have different issue positions than
Caucasians who identify themselves as conservative. It is expected that Black
conservatism means something distinctly different than White conservatism. In
order to test this hypothesis, issue positions of both groups will be cross-tabulated
against ideological identification and difference of means test will be done. For
example, when respondents are asked about laws protecting homosexuals, those
who identify themselves as conservative should be against laws protecting
homosexuals and those who identify themselves as liberal would favor laws
protecting homosexuals. However, there is an expectation that African-American
conservatives and Caucasians who identify themselves as conservative may
disagree on this issue.
And the following question remains. Do Black conservatives have
different issue positions than Black liberals? These questions will examine
differences between liberals and conservatives on issues that are more relevant to
African-Americans. These questions are only provided in the NBES and they
deal with a variety of topics ranging from economic power to political power.
These questions where chosen because they were issues where Black conservative
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intellectuals have views that are different from the masses. On these questions
Black conservatives and liberals should have different positions. For example, for
questions dealing with such topics as self-help, entrepreneurialism, and
affirmative action, we should see clear differences between Black liberals and
conservatives. The hypothesis is that Black liberals and conservatives will take
different positions on these issues. This hypothesis will be addressed by crosstabulating the issue positions of the respondent’s ideological identification and
issue position.
Finally, levels of constraint will be examined. Constraint is “the success
we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a
specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes” (Converse,
1964, 297). Constraint will be measured by an analysis of correlations between
ideology and several issues from the 1996 NES. These issues include questions
pertaining the respondent’s self placement on the help to Blacks, guarantee
job/standard of living, reduction of crime, women’s rights, protect the
environment/jobs, abortion, service/spending, defense spending, and health
insurance scales. An average correlation measure will be calculated to measure
level of constraint for Caucasians and African-Americans. It is expected that
African-Americans have lower levels of constraint than Caucasians because
conservatism may have different meanings for African-Americans.
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

African-American Ideological Trends
Hypothesis One is confirmed. The data in Table 5-1 indicate an ebb and flow in
African-American ideological identification between periods of liberalism and
conservatism. While Caucasians have consistently identified themselves as
conservative over the time period studied, increasing no more than ten percent,
African-Americans have experienced a conservative trend by doubling their
numbers. The number of African-Americans identifying themselves as
conservative rose sharply between 1972 to 1998, from 14% to 34%. Those
identifying themselves as liberal decreased from 54% in 1972 to 40% in 1998.
During the same time period, the proportion of Caucasians identifying themselves
as conservative stayed the same. These results contradict earlier studies that have
discovered no conservative movement among African-Americans (Welch &
Foster, 1987; Welch & Combs, 1985; Seltzer & Smith, 1985).
The data also indicate a sharp shift in ideology among African-Americans
between 1976 and 1980. Large proportions of African-Americans appear to have
taken up the conservatism of the general electorate. Although Caucasians have
consistently demonstrated higher levels of conservatism than African-Americans.
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African-Americans experienced more dramatic changes in ideology. Specifically,
between 1976 and 1980, conservatism among African-Americans more than
doubled, increasing from 12% to 30%, while Caucasians only experienced a
seven-percentage point increase. Even though the number of African-Americans
identifying themselves as conservatives decreased during the 1980s, a resurgence
occurred between 1992 and 1998. The number of conservatives increased by ten
percent, from 24% to 34%. The major increase in the proportion of AfricanAmericans identifying themselves as conservative appears to have occurred
between 1994 and 1996.
The results from Table 5-1 came from the National Election Study (NES),
which contains a small proportion of African-Americans. These analyses are
supplemented with data from the National Black Election Study (NBES) which is
presented in Table 5-2. Although this analysis does not indicate a conservative
trend, there are limitations to conducting trend analyses on this data because there
are only two years examined, 1984, and 1996. During this time period, the NES
demonstrates changes in the proportion of African-Americans identifying
themselves as conservative, from 25% in 1984 to 33% in 1996. Other limitations
of the NBES are that it was first done in 1984, twelve years after the NES started
asking ideological questions. Moreover, the question formats and coding in the
NBES are different from those in the NES. For example, the NES provides the
respondent with a seven-point scale from extremely liberal to extremely
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TABLE 5-2
AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION
NATIONAL BLACK ELECTION STUDY
1984

1996

LIBERAL

33%

38%

MODERATE

38%

39%

CONSERVATIVE

24%

23%

N

753

996

Source: National Black Election Study, Variables 2103 and G1.

conservative, while the NBES does not. It only provides the respondent with a
three point scale. The lack of data dealing with African-Americans prior to 1984
has not allowed researchers the opportunity to analyze the political views of
African-Americans. Moreover, the question formatting and coding of the NBES
for 1984 and 1996 does not allow for adequate comparisons between the two data
sets. This is clearly an oversight on the part of researchers. The data from the
NBES suggest that at least a quarter of African-Americans are conservative. In
short, both data sets indicate that a conservative trend has taken place among
African-Americans. Somewhere between one-fourth and one-third of AfricanAmericans identify themselves as conservative. This is a substantial enough subset of the Black population to warrant further investigation.
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Possible Explanations
Several scholars have offered explanations as to why we may expect an increase
in the number of African-Americans who identify themselves as conservative.
West (1994) argues that the inadequacy of Black liberalism has led to the rise of
African-American conservatives. This inadequacy is visible when one observes
the lack of political leadership in the African-American community. The
argument goes that the deaths of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X left
African-Americans without leadership. This has enabled conservatives to
dominate political discourse. In order to make up for this lack of leadership,
African-American conservatives sought to undermine whatever leaders there were
and to “replace them with Black Republicans (or even conservative Black
Democrats), who downplay governmental regulation and stress market
mechanisms and success-oriented values in Black communities” (West, 148). In
short, African-American conservative intellectuals believe that they provide an
innovative way to look at problems.
Not only did a lack of leadership contribute to the rise of conservatism in
the African-American community, but Singer (1991) argues that the Reagan
Revolution also contributed to this increase. Conservative African-Americans
having an ideological compatriot in the White House may be able to explain more
African-Americans identifying themselves as conservative. President Reagan was
openly hostile to the Civil Rights leadership. He sought to bypass them and work
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with conservatives even if they happened to be Black. Furthermore, President
Reagan also held a number of meetings with major Black conservative groups
such as the Council for a Black Economic Agenda and the National Center for
Neighborhood Enterprise. The head of Reagan’s transition team, Edwin Meeese,
also held a conference in California for Black dissidents from liberal leadership
who were sympathetic to Reagan’s goals. The twelve years of the Reagan
presidency allowed Black conservatives to become “gatekeepers” in the capitol
who could spread their conservative message through the media. Not only were
African-American conservatives visible on Reagan’s campaign task forces, but
they were also appointed to key positions in his administration.
Others attribute the increase of African-American conservatism to social
ills and the structural reformation of the economy. One author has noted: “The
social problems of urban America are turning more Blacks back to the values of
religion, family, and self-help. Meanwhile the cutting back of government is
shrinking faith in the traditional path of middle-class advancement, closely
associated with Democratic [liberal] politics” (Economist, 26).
Finally, the increasing upward mobility of African-Americans could
explain an increase in conservatism. The Black middle-class desires the same
things as the White middle-class. Black conservatives are saying, “I want a safe
neighborhood [for] my kids to be able to grow up in, I want good schools, I want
all these things and I’m not getting them” (Ashbee, 1999:241). In short, whether
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it is the lack of leadership or the growing middle-class, there has been an increase
in the proportion of Blacks identifying themselves as conservative.
Caucasian Ideological Trends
Table 5-3 contains the results of my analysis for Caucasians. It confirms that a
conservative movement has not taken place among Caucasians. When AfricanAmericans experienced sharp increases in conservatism, Caucasians experienced
declines. For example, between 1978 and 1980, African-Americans who
identified themselves as conservative doubled from 15% to 30%, while the
percentage of Caucasian conservatives only increased by 7%, from 39% to 46%.
This is also evident between 1994 and 1996, when African-Americans who
identified themselves as conservative increased from 24% to 33%, and
Caucasians who identified themselves as conservative actually decreased from
48% to 46%. During the time period studied, while African-American
conservatives increased by 20%, Caucasian conservatives only increased by one
percentage point. There seems to be more of a liberal trend among Caucasians.
Those identifying themselves as liberals increased by nine percentage points from
23% in 1972 to 34% in 1998. This finding confirms the work of several scholars
who state that there is no conservative trend in the general electorate.
For example, during the same time period that Robinson and Fleishman
(1984) found an increase in conservative identification, they also found a move
toward liberalism in issue positions. In an analysis of GSS data, they found that
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the proportion of respondents opposing laws against interracial marriages
increased as well as those favoring the legalization of marijuana.
GSS data also indicate a liberalized sociopolitical climate. Robinson and
Fleishman (1984) state that this climate signifies disenchantment of the Reagan
administration and its conservatism. They argue that the public has supported
increased spending on almost all domestic welfare programs, such as the
environment, healthcare, welfare, and race relations. At the same time, the public
has supported decreased spending on defense programs.
In summary, this research has found that there are substantial numbers of
Blacks who identify themselves as conservative. Thus, it supports the notion that
a Black conservative group exists in the electorate. But the question remains: Are
Black and White conservatives similar in their partisan preferences and vote
choices? More specifically, is conservatism among African-Americans
manifested in partisan preferences and electoral choices? Previous research
suggests that African-American are overwhelmingly loyal to the Democratic
Party despite the fact that at least a quarter of them are conservative. The next
section concerns the issue of partisanship and electoral choices.
Partisanship
What exactly does it mean that there is a substantial African-American
conservative cohort? This section examines the partisan preferences of AfricanAmericans and Caucasians during the time period studied. It seeks to find if
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African-American and Caucasian conservatives have the same partisan
preferences and electoral choices.
Aldrich (1995) states that the American party system consists of a
majority and minority party which are centered on different values. “The
Democrats are more likely to favor the active intervention of the government”
which is a liberal position (p. 8). “Whereas the Republicans are much less so
inclined” commonly held to be the conservative position (p. 8). Respondents who
identify themselves, as conservative should prefer the Republican Party and those
who identify themselves as liberal should prefer the Democratic Party. Therefore,
there should be some similarity between the proportion of African-Americans
who identify themselves as conservative and those who prefer the Republican
Party.
Although there has been an increase in the proportion of AfricanAmericans identifying themselves as conservative, this finding is contradicted
when one examines this group’s partisan preferences. Table 5-4 indicates that
collectively, African-Americans are overwhelmingly loyal to the Democratic
Party. In 1998, while 34% of African-Americans identified themselves as
conservative, 79% preferred the Democratic Party, while only 4% preferred the
Republican Party. This finding confirms the work of previous scholars
(Meyerson, 1984; Tryman, 1986; Welch and Foster, 1987; Bolce, De Maio, and
Muzzio, 1992; Dawson, 1995; Goode, 1996; Simpson, 1998). There seems to be
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some discrepancy between African-American’s ideological identifications and
partisan preferences. It is logical to assume that conservative ideological
identification should also dictate a Republican partisan preference. But this is not
true among African-Americans.
Examining the ideological identifications and partisan preferences of
Caucasians, one finds consistency. Table 5-5 indicates that Whites have divided
their ideological and partisan loyalties according to expectations. In 1972, 39%
identified themselves as conservative and 37% preferred the Republican Party.
This finding is consistent even in 1996, when 46% of Caucasians identified
themselves as conservative and 47% preferred the Republican Party. It seems for
the most part that conservatism may have different meanings for AfricanAmericans than Caucasians. This is evident through the fact that we would have
expected for Blacks who identify themselves as conservative to also prefer the
Republican Party to the Democrats. But this is not the case, Blacks as a group
prefer the Democratic Party to the Republicans.
However, the data from Table 5-4 indicate a decline in Democratic loyalty
among African-Americans. Democratic loyalty reached its highest point in 1982
(91%) but decreased to 79% in 1984. Contrary to previous research that
documents an increase in the number of African-Americans who prefer the
Republican Party, that number has also decreased from 11% in 1972 to 4% in
1998. The data also indicate a slight increase in the percentage of African87

Americans who refer to themselves as independent, from 12% in 1972 to 18% in
1998. This is consistent with previous research that documents an increase in
independent party identification.
Electoral Choice
The changes in partisan preferences among African-Americans should also be
evident when examining the electoral choices of this group. There should be a
decline in the proportion of African-Americans who choose the Democratic
presidential candidate. To really see if there is a conflict between ideological
identification and partisanship, the electoral preferences of African-Americans
must be examined. As previously stated, research argues that African-Americans
show overwhelming support for the Democratic Party. However, if a third of
African-Americans identify themselves as conservative, then that same proportion
should also choose the Republican Party during elections. Table 5-6 indicates
that this is not the case. There is discrepancy between African-American’s
ideological identification, partisan preference, and electoral choices. In every
presidential year from 1972 to 1996, more than eighty percent of AfricanAmericans supported the Democratic presidential candidate. The only year that
more than a tenth of this group supported the Republican candidate was 1972. In
that year, 13% of African-Americans chose the Republican candidate. AfricanAmerican voters support for Democratic presidential candidates is even more
pronounced in the last presidential election, when 96% of African-Americans
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chose the Democratic candidate. This is true despite the fact that 32% identified
themselves as conservative, which should denote support for the Republican
presidential candidate.
When one examines the electoral choices of Caucasians, one finds that
their electoral preferences are in tune with their ideology and partisan preferences.
Table 5-7 demonstrates that in the last presidential election, 42% of Caucasians
chose the Republican presidential candidate while 46% identified themselves as
conservative. This finding is consistent with the literature, which suggests that
conservative ideological identification should also denote Republican partisan
preferences which should carry over into Republican electoral choices.
Contrary to previous research, this study has found that there is indeed an
overall conservative trend among African-Americans. There also seems to be
some discrepancy between Black ideological identification, partisanship, and
electoral preferences. This discrepancy is not present among Caucasians.
Although nearly a third of African-Americans identify themselves as
conservative, the same level of support is not found when one examines their
partisan preferences and electoral choices. This leads to the conclusion that
conservatism among African-Americans may mean something distinctly different
than conservatism among Whites. For example, commentaries that discuss Black
political thought do so from a social or moral perspective. They emphasize self-
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reliance, entrepreneurship, and life-style choices, while White conservatives stress
issues that deal with government involvement in the economy and positions on
such issues as affirmative action. For example, one Black conservative
intellectual views conservatism this way, he states, “It seems to me that
conservatism is best understood as a state of mind and type of character, a way of
looking at the social order” (Walker, 1997:29). Although Black conservatives do
espouse views on the same issues as White conservatives, they tend to emphasize
morality and individual self-reliance more than their White counterparts.
The Issues
This section will first compare differences that may exist between Black and
White conservatives by examining issue positions in both the 1996 NES and the
1996 NBES. Afterwards, the 1996 NBES will be utilized to see if there are any
differences between Black liberals and Black conservatives.
According to the literature, a conservative is more likely than a liberal to
1) oppose laws protecting homosexuals; 2) favor the death penalty; 3) oppose
government spending on domestic programs such as healthcare, welfare, and
other social services. On these issues, there should also be vast disagreement
between respondents who identified themselves as liberal and those who
identified themselves as conservative. Several issue dimensions will be
examined. Feeling thermometer questions will also be utilized to ascertain
whether or not Black and White conservatives give political leaders, who support
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their beliefs, similar ratings. The social dimension will examine respondents’
positions on laws protecting homosexuals, crime, and the death penalty. The
economic dimension will look at several questions related to food stamp spending
and government aid to Blacks.
The first issue examined is a social one. It concerns laws protecting
homosexuals. Respondents are asked if they favor or oppose laws protecting
homosexuals against job discrimination. The literature states that conservatives
are more likely than liberals to oppose these laws. Figure 5-1 indicates that
Blacks who identify themselves as conservative are more likely than liberals to
oppose laws protecting homosexuals. The figure also indicates that the
differences between the groups are statistically significant. Slightly less than half,
(about 39%) of African-Americans who identify themselves as conservative
oppose laws protecting homosexuals, while only 28% of liberals oppose these
laws. Contrary to expectations, however, nearly two-thirds (about 61%) of Black
conservatives favor these laws, compared to 73% of liberals. A large percentage
of moderate Blacks also favor these laws, about 72%. This is clearly
contradictory to the conservative position. There is indeed some conflict among
African-American conservatives when it comes to their positions on laws
protecting homosexuals. Nonetheless, a small percentage of Blacks who say they
are conservative do appear to adopt the conservative position on this issue.
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FIGURE 5-1
**LAWS PROTECTING HOMOSEXUALS
AGAINST JOB DISCRIMINATION
1996 NATIONAL BLACK ELECTION STUDY

However, if we examine the positions of Caucasians on this issue we find
that they are predictable. Specifically, there are significant differences between
Caucasians who identify themselves as conservative and liberal on laws
protecting homosexuals. Slightly more than half (53%) of Caucasian
conservatives oppose laws protecting homosexuals, while less than fifteen percent
of Caucasian liberals oppose these laws. Figure 5-2 also shows that while only
47% of conservatives favor these laws, a clear majority (87%) of liberals favor
laws protecting homosexuals.
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The tables clearly indicate that there are significant differences between
Black liberals and conservatives and White liberals and conservatives when it
comes to laws protecting homosexuals. But are there differences between Black
and White conservatives? The conservative position on this issue is to oppose
laws protecting homosexuals. Upon comparing these two groups, we find a
thirteen-percentage point difference between these two groups. The data indicate
that 53% of White conservatives oppose these laws while only 40% of Black
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conservatives do. In fact, we find that Black conservatives are more likely to
favor laws protecting homosexuals, rather than oppose them. The Black
conservative position is not as strong as White conservatives, to oppose these
laws. In short, on this issue there are some differences between Black and White
conservatives.
The next issue examined is also a social one. It concerns support for the
death penalty. The conservative position is to support the death penalty. Figure
5-3 indicates that African-Americans, liberals, moderates and conservatives, show
great support for the death penalty. In fact, there are virtually no differences
between liberals and conservatives on this issue. About 53% of both groups favor
the death penalty. African-Americans as a group agree with each other on the
death penalty. Similar to the previous findings, White views on the death penalty
are congruent with expectations. Figure 5-4 indicates significant differences
between White liberals and conservatives. An overwhelming majority of
Caucasian conservatives favor the death penalty, (88%) compared to only 66% of
liberals. Furthermore, only 12% of conservatives oppose the death penalty while
about one-third of liberals oppose it. In short, White views on the death penalty
conform to expectations.
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When comparing the views of Black and White conservatives on the death
penalty we find even larger differences than on the issue of protecting
homosexuals against job discrimination. Fifty-three percent of Black
conservatives support the conservative position, compared to eighty-eight percent
of White conservatives. This is nearly a thirty-percentage point difference. Once
again, we find that the hypothesis is confirmed. For the most part, Black
conservatives take different positions than White conservatives. Although there is
a sub-set of African-Americans that support the conservative position (40%), their
views are not as pronounced as the proportion of Whites who do the same (53%).
The economic dimension contains several questions that will be examined.
Comparisons between Black liberals and Black conservatives as well as
comparisons between Black and White conservatives will be undertaken. This set
of questions taps into one of the major aspects of Black conservatism the belief in
self-reliance (Eisenstadt, 1999). Black conservative intellectuals believe that the
government cannot provide solutions to the problems of the Black community
(Toler, 1993; DeVaux, 1997). In fact, the government’s attempt to solve poverty
with the New Deal and Great Society programs, they argue, handicapped many
Blacks because it created a sense of dependency. Black conservatives believe that
the “welfare state has helped destroy many Black families by taking wage-earning
fathers out of homes and replacing them with a monthly government check”
(Lovelace, 1997:47). They argue that that before America’s “War on Poverty”
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many Black businesses thrived and many Black people were financially
successful. They give examples of several Black banks that stayed in business
even when White ones failed during the Great Depression. They also argue that,
years before, many slaves took advantage of the American free enterprise system
by purchasing their freedom. With this, we assume that there will be significant
differences between Black liberals and conservatives on this issue.
The first question concerns spending on food stamps. It asks respondents
whether they believe that spending on food stamps should be increased,
decreased, or kept about the same. Conservatives should be more likely than
liberals to respond that spending on food stamps should be decreased.
Figure 5-5 contains the results from this question. Similar to the responses
from previous questions, there are no significant differences between Black
liberals and conservatives on this issue. In fact, nearly the same percentage (60%)
of liberals, moderates and conservatives believe that spending on food stamps
should stay the same. Although there are slightly more conservatives than liberals
who believe spending should be decreased, these differences are not significant.
However, when a comparison is done between White liberals and
conservatives, one finds that there are significant differences between the groups.
For example, Figure 5-6 indicates that about 65% of White conservatives believe
that spending on food stamps should be decreased compared to only 31% of
liberals who believe the same. Moreover, about a third of White conservatives
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and more than half of White liberals believe that spending on food stamps should
be kept about the same.
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For Black conservatives, this question relates to the concept of self-help
and individual responsibility. For White conservatives it deals with limited
government involvement in social programs. Since this question has considerable
meaning for both groups, both groups of conservatives should have similar
positions. The data indicate otherwise. They show that there are sharp
differences between Black and White conservatives. While 65% of White
conservatives believe that spending on food stamps should be decreased, 61% of
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Black conservatives believe that spending should be kept the same. There are
clearly differences present when referring to conservatism among Blacks and
Whites.
The next question examined should also show agreement between Black
and White conservatives. It deals with whether the respondent believes the
government should provide aid to Blacks to improve their economic and social
positions. Again, this question relates to the Black conservative belief in selfreliance. Black conservative intellectuals state that the problems of the AfricanAmerican community “cannot be remedied by government policy alone” (Toler,
1993:5). A major argument of Black conservatives is that the creation of
government programs helped to destroy two institutions that were vital to
African-Americans: work and marriage. They note the increase in illegitimacy
and crime rates in the Black community and attribute these problems to
government aid programs. Black conservatives believe that it is important that
the Black community seek solutions to their own problems without assistance
from the government. For this question, we also expect differences between
Black liberals and conservatives.
First differences among Blacks will be examined, and then comparisons
will be made between Black and White conservatives. This question provided the
respondent with a range from one to seven. One means that the “government
should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks”
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and seven means “the government should not make any special effort to help
Blacks because they should help themselves.” Similar to the previous question,
this question deals with an issue central to Black conservative thought, self-help.
There should be significant differences between Black conservatives and liberals
on this issue.
Figure 5-7 indicates that there are statistically significant differences
between Black liberals and conservatives on this issue. The mean for Black
conservatives is 3.76, which means that Black conservatives believe that the
government should not make any special effort to aid Blacks. However, the
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liberal position is not far behind the conservative position, with a mean at 3.32,
also leaning towards the government not making any special efforts to aid Blacks.
The mean for the entire sample, 3.46, is higher than the mean for liberals.
Nonetheless, Black conservatives maintain their belief in self-help.
There are also significant differences between White conservatives and
liberals. The differences between Caucasians are more pronounced than they are
between African-Americans. For example, Figure 5-8 shows that the mean for
conservatives is 5.36, whereas the mean for liberals is 4.15.
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Despite the fact that this issue deals with a major belief of Black
conservative thought, there are clear differences between Black and White
conservatives. One would think that Black conservatives would align themselves
with White conservatives on this issue, but this is not the case. The mean Black
conservative position was 3.76, while the White conservative position was 5.36,
nearly a two point difference. Although Black conservatives lean more toward
their belief in self-reliance and limited government involvement, it is not as
pronounced as the White conservative position. Again, this leaves the question as
to what conservatism means among African-Americans.
So far, we know from examining four issues - laws protecting
homosexuals against job discrimination, the death penalty, government spending
on food stamps, and government aid to Blacks - that there are indeed differences
between Blacks who identify themselves as conservative and Whites who do the
same. In all of the issues examined, there were significant differences between
Black and White conservatives. At least half of Whites who said they were
conservative chose the conservative position, while less than half of Black
conservatives chose the same position. This leads to the conclusion that
conservatism may mean something different among Blacks than it does among
Whites.
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Ratings of Political Leaders
Another way to determine whether or not there are differences between the way
Black and White conservatives think is to examine their ratings of different
political leaders. Both the NES and the NBES provide several questions in which
respondents are asked to give a thermometer rating ranging from one to one
hundred to various political leaders such as Newt Gingrich, Colin Powell, and
Louis Farrakhan. These leaders were chosen because of their support for
conservative values in America.
First, comparisons will be made between how Black liberals and
conservatives and White liberals and conservatives rate these leaders, then
comparisons will be made between Black and White conservatives on how they
rated these leaders.
Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the House, led the conservative
movement in America after the 1994 midterm congressional elections. Generally
speaking, conservatives should give him significantly higher ratings than liberals.
His ratings among Blacks reveal significant differences. Figure 5-9 show that
Black conservatives give Gingrich far higher ratings than Black liberals on a scale
from one to one hundred. The mean rating for conservatives is 32, while the
mean for liberals is 20. In general, Blacks give Gingrich low ratings. However,
conservatives are more likely to give him high rating than liberals.
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There are also significant differences between White liberal and
conservative ratings of Gingrich. Figure 5-10 displays these results. White
conservatives give higher ratings to Gingrich at a mean of 53, while liberals give
a rating of 22. This clearly indicates that Whites as a group give him higher
ratings than Blacks.
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However, Black conservatives give Gingrich higher ratings than White liberals
do. While there are differences between Black and White conservatives on these
ratings, both groups conform to expectations. Both groups of conservatives give
higher ratings to Gingrich than liberals. However, White conservatives give
Gingrich higher ratings than Black conservatives about 20 points. Again, this
indicates that conservatism for Blacks may mean something different than it does
for Whites. In short, there are clear differences between the two groups.
Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has professed
a conservative belief system throughout his career. He has also made it known
that he affiliates with Republican Party. Moreover, Powell consistently receives
high ratings from Blacks and Whites, both liberals and conservatives. In fact, a
Black conservative intellectual expressed disappointment in Powell’s decision not
to run for president. Shelby Steele states that Colin Powell, "said the right things
and stood for the right things" (Conti and Stetson, 1997:145). Black conservative
intellectuals believe that Powell is the person who could have realigned AfricanAmericans to the Republican Party as a presidential candidate. But he refused to
run for president. Thus, since he is an African-American that professes a
conservative philosophy I expect there to be some difference between how Black
liberals and Black conservatives rate him. But, there are no significant
differences among African-Americans and how they rate Colin Powell. Figure 511 indicates that Blacks as a group give him high ratings. The mean rating for
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Black conservatives is 68 while the mean rating for liberals is 65, only a three
point difference.
Recent popularity polls show that Powell had higher ratings than President
Clinton. The same polls showed that more Whites supported Powell than Blacks
(Conti and Stetson, 1997). The conservative ideology that Powell professes is
evident through Figure 5-12 which displays how Caucasians rate him. There are
significant differences between how White liberals and conservatives rate Colin
Powell. Although Whites in general give him high ratings, conservatives give
Powell higher ratings than liberals, and the differences between these groups are
significant.
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Finally, we examine ratings of Louis Farrakhan, Nation of Islam leader,
who sponsored the “Million Man March” in October 1995. Black political
commentators suggest that this march signified a moment in history when Black
Americans began to see the restoration of morality and traditional family values
as a priority. More specifically, the event garnered support from one million
Black men who wanted to “to atone for past sins and to take responsibility for
their own lives, families, and their communities” (Jones, 1998:37). The general
tone of the march was a conservative one. Its leaders agreed that through self108

help and righteous behavior by Black men, Black America could achieve racial
equality (Farrar, 1999). Due to the response Farrakhan received from leadership
in this event we would expect to find Black conservatives giving him higher
ratings than liberals. However, Figure 5-13 does not reveal this. Instead it shows
that Black liberals give him higher ratings than conservatives, but these ratings do
not indicate statistically significant differences between the two groups.
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Whites in general, both liberals and conservatives give Farrakhan low
ratings. Figure 5-14 displays the results. There are significant differences
between how these groups rate Farrakhan. The mean for conservatives was
15.82, and the mean for liberals was 23.22. Respondents’ ratings for Farrakhan
are somewhat similar to those for Gingrich. Whites in general rate Gingrich
highly, while Blacks in general give Farrakhan high ratings. However, we do see
that Black liberals give Farrakhan higher ratings than Black conservatives do.
This is surprising when one considers the fact that Black political commentators
consider Farrakhan a leader who espouses a conservative political thought. For
example, they point to the Million Man March and its conservative theme and the
goals of the Nation of Islam (Farrar, 1999).
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Again, it is clear that there are differences between Black and White
conservatives. The hypothesis has been confirmed through an analysis of issue
positions and ratings of conservative political leaders. Three political figures
were chosen, Gingrich, Powell, and Farrakhan. While Gingrich and Farrakhan
may represent extreme views for Whites and Blacks, Powell has an appeal to all
Americans regardless of their race or political views. It is on this question where
Black and White conservatives have similar views. There is less than a five-point
difference in the ratings Black and White conservatives give Colin Powell.
However, there are large differences between Black and White conservatives on
how they rate Gingrich and Farrakhan.
To further examine possible differences that may exist between Caucasians and
African-Americans, two additional variables were examined, religiousity and
education.1 Both variables were expected to have a significant impact on the
respondent’s ideological identification. Religiousity was measured by how often
the respondent attended church services, and it was expected that there would be
significant differences between liberals and conservatives. This meaning that
respondents who identified themselves as conservatives, Caucasian and AfricanAmerican, would be more religious than those who identified themselves as
liberal. However, similar to previous findings, this is not the case. The
expectation of conservatives being more religious holds true among Caucasians
but not for African-Americans. Among Caucasians, a larger
1

The results of these analyses are located in the appendix (Pages 155-158).
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proportion of conservatives than liberals attended church services weekly and the
differences between these groups were statistically significant. When AfricanAmericans are examined though, the same proportion of respondents, whether
they identify themselves as liberal or conservative, attended church services
weekly.
Unlike religiousity, education has a significant impact on how AfricanAmericans identify themselves ideologically. African-Americans with a high
school and junior college education are more conservative than those with only a
grade school education or those who have received a bachelor’s degree or beyond.
The differences between these groups are also statistically significant. Education
has the same affect among Caucasians, however, there is a substantial subset of
Caucasians with bachelor’s degrees and beyond to identify themselves as
conservative. In short, education has a significant impact on ideological
identification for African-Americans and Caucasians, but religiousity only has an
impact on Caucasians.
African-American and Caucasian Conservatives: A Summary
Several questions were examined and comparisons were made between Black and
Whites conservatives. The hypotheses are confirmed: there are differences in the
partisan preferences and electoral choices of Black and White conservatives.
Although nearly a third of African-Americans identify themselves as
conservative, the same percentage do not express conservative choices when one
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examines their partisan preferences and electoral choices. But when Caucasians
are examined we find that they are consistent. Caucasians who say they are
conservative are more likely to support the Republican Party and its political
agenda. In short, there is discrepancy when it comes to African-Americans
ideology, party identification, and electoral choice. This research confirms that
African-Americans remain overwhelmingly loyal to the Democratic Party
(Meyerson, 1984; Tryman, 1986; Welch & Foster, 1987; Muzzio, 1992; Bolce,
De Maio, and Muzzio, 1992; Dawson, 1995; Goode, 1996; Simpson, 1998).
In the beginning of this paper, definitions of “liberal” and “conservative”
thought were discussed. Liberalism holds to the belief that the government
should play an active role in domestic policy and it demonstrates tolerance for
social change and diversity. Conversely, conservatism demonstrates a strong
resistance to government involvement in domestic affairs. It also demonstrates
strong support for traditional social values, economic individualism, and order
(Knight, 1999).
Keeping those definitions in mind, I sought to find if African-American
conservatives conformed to the views espoused by conservatives in the general
electorate. All of the issues examined tap into some aspect of what conservatism
means. Laws protecting homosexuals deal with diversity and social values. The
conservative position on this issue would be to cling to traditional values.
Conservatives are therefore more likely to oppose these laws. The death penalty
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issue also taps into the conservative value of morality and deference to authority.
Conservatives are more likely to favor the death penalty. The next two questions
deal with government involvement in domestic affairs, which conservatives
oppose.
Of the issue questions examined, only two of the questions revealed
similarities between Black and White conservatives’ ratings of Colin Powell and
government aid to Blacks. In all, there were clear differences between Black and
White conservatives. The data support the hypothesis that conservatism for
Blacks means something different than it does for Whites. In detail, we found
that 53 percent of White conservatives opposed laws protecting homosexuals,
while only 39 percent of Black conservatives opposed these laws. There were
similar differences found on issue positions on the death penalty. Eighty-eight
percent of White conservatives favor the death penalty while only fifty-three
percent of Black conservatives favor it. Furthermore, there were also large
differences between Black and White conservatives on government spending on
food stamps. Sixty-five percent of White conservatives believed spending should
be decreased while only twenty-four percent of Black conservatives believe
spending should be decreased. An examination of these three questions reveals
that there are significant differences between Black and White conservatives.
These findings indicate one of two things: either that African-American
conservatism means something distinctly different than conservatism among
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Whites, or that African-Americans who say they are conservative do not
understand what conservatism means. There is support for both conclusions. As
previously stated, Black conservatism deals more with social and moral concerns
than with political issues. Black conservative political thought has always
emphasized self-reliance, entrepreneurship, and life-style choices. In fact, early
Black political leaders sometimes sacrificed participation in the political system
for the accomplishment of these goals (Eisenstadt, 1999). No element of
conservatism among Whites sacrifices political participation. Moreover,
contemporary Black conservatism emphasizes religion more than politics. They
see conservatism being about self-restraint and sacrifice for others (Goode, 1996).
In short, it is possible that conservatism means something different for Blacks
than it does for Whites.
There is also substantial support for the claim that African-Americans who
say they are conservative are not sure as to what conservatism means based on the
definitions scholars use. Studies in political science dating back to the two
landmark studies of Campbell Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) and Converse
(1964) found that the American electorate is unsophisticated. Recent studies have
confirmed the findings of these studies. They state that the impact of ideology
has been overstated because large numbers of respondents select themselves out
of analysis by not responding to questions relating to ideology (Stimson, 1975).
Gant and Luttbeg (1985) confirm this finding. They state that individuals often
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respond to survey questions about ideology by stating “that they had not thought
much about the words, or they did not know what they meant” (82).
Despite continued efforts on the part of political scientists to nullify the
importance of ideology, several scholars’ state that ideology continues to have an
impact on electoral behavior. More specifically, Holm and Robinson, (1978) and
Levitin and Miller (1979) found that ideology had significant predictive power in
several presidential elections. Moreover, Jacoby (1995) found that the electorate
had different levels of ideological thinking. And no matter what the level was,
people consistently chose the candidate closest to their views. Therefore, scholars
continue to pursue research dealing with ideology.
More specific to this study is Converse’s (1964) seminal work, which
focused on the differences in the belief systems held by political elites and the
masses. The next section will compare whether Blacks who say they are
conservative have the same views as Black conservative intellectuals.
African-American Liberals and Conservatives: The Differences
Since Black and White conservatives seem to have slightly different views on
these issues, further analysis and explanation of what conservatism means among
Blacks is needed. This section will examine differences between liberals and
conservatives on issues that are unique to African-Americans. These questions
are only provided in the NBES and they deal with a variety of topics ranging from
economic power to political power. These questions were chosen because they
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were issues on which Black conservatives and liberals should have different
positions. For example, for questions dealing with such topics as self-help,
entrepreneurialism, and affirmative action, we should see clear differences
between Black liberals and conservatives.
The first question that will be examined concerns whether the respondent
believes there has been progress in getting rid of racial discrimination. Again,
this question is central to Black conservative thought. For clarification, Black
conservative thought or a reference to Black conservatives consists mainly of the
beliefs of Black conservative intellectuals. Conservatives choose to focus on the
opportunities America has to offer rather than the problems faced by Blacks. To
those who argue that there is more to achieve, Black conservative intellectuals
point to the many successes that have been achieved by numerous Blacks.
Conservative intellectuals believe that racial discrimination is no longer an
obstacle to Black progress. As Toler (1993), states, Black conservatives
intellectuals argue, “We can speak of a racist American past, but not of racist
contemporary America” (5). Therefore, there should be visible differences
between liberals and conservatives. Conservatives should be more likely to state
that there has been much progress while liberals would be more likely to say that
there has not been progress. Figure 5-15 displays the results.
There are significant differences between Black liberal and conservatives
on this issue. Blacks who identify themselves as conservative are more likely to
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state that there has been a lot of progress, while liberals are more likely to state
that there has not been much change in ending racial discrimination. Although
more Blacks who identify themselves as conservative take the conservative issue
position, nearly 61% of them believe that there has not been much real change.
This finding is clearly contrary to the Black conservatives’ attempt to accentuate
the positive aspects of America rather than focusing on problems AfricanAmericans have encountered.
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The next question deals with the entrepreneurial aspects of Black
conservative thought. The idea underlying this issue is that Blacks should make
use of capitalism and provide resources for themselves. It also argues that Blacks
should support and shop in Black owned stores, a belief found in the writings of
many Black conservative political leaders. Black conservative intellectuals state
that “Blacks need to focus on Black entrepreneurship, building and supporting
Black businesses” (Toler, 1993:6). This question asks respondents if they
agree/disagree with the following statement: “Black people should shop in Black
owned stores whenever possible.” Again, there should be significant differences
between Black liberals and conservatives on this question because it taps into a
major belief of Black conservatism, entrepreneurialism and self-reliance. Figure
5-16 displays the results.
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The data indicate that there are significant differences between these two
groups, but not in the expected direction. Black conservatives should be more
likely to agree with the statement while liberals would be less likely. The data
indicate otherwise. A larger percentage of liberals (67%) than conservatives
(54%) agreed with this statement, and the differences are statistically significant.
In fact, more conservatives than liberals disagree with this statement, which
according to the literature is an underlying belief of Black conservatism. This
figure suggests that Blacks who identify themselves as conservative may not
actually know what they mean when they use that term. More specifically,
Blacks in the general electorate do not view conservatism the same way the Black
conservative intellectuals view conservatism. However, this result may have
more to do with the fact that more than likely, Blacks in general agree that they
should shop in Black owned stores whenever possible.
The next question deals with government assistance to minorities in
employment. It asks the respondent whether they agree/disagree with the
following statement, “Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given
special consideration when decisions are made about hiring applicants for jobs.”
This question taps into whether the respondent supports affirmative action
programs. Affirmative action is opposed by most Black conservative intellectuals
who believe that these programs foster a sense of inferiority among Blacks
because they are not confident that their career success stems from their talents.
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Moreover, these groups of conservative Blacks believe that affirmative action
programs cause society to generalize from the aggregate to the individual.
According to Stephen Carter (1991), these programs make society assume what
the typical Black is and when an exceptional person is encountered, who happens
to Black, they are deemed to be an “exception to the rule.” Other conservatives
such as Ward Connerly and Clarence Thomas have put forth major efforts to
voice Black conservatives’ opposition to these programs and to help eliminate
them. Therefore, there should be clear differences between Black conservatives
and liberals. Figure 5-17 displays the results.
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Similar to previous figures, there are no significant differences between
Black liberals and conservatives even though we expected Black conservatives to
take a strong stand on this issue. In fact, there is general agreement among all
respondents that special consideration should be given to minority applicants.
Finally, we examine the partisan preferences of Black liberals and
conservatives. As previously stated, conservatism is manifested in the Republican
Party and liberalism in the Democratic Party. Thus, a natural assumption is for
Black conservatives to identify with the Republican Party and liberals with the
Democratic Party. In fact, Bravo (1998) states that “As more African-Americans
reach middle and upper-middle-class status, we will continue to see a similar
increase in the number of those people who espouse the conservative policies of
the Republican Party” (21). In fact, African-Americans and Republicans agree on
a variety of issues where they embrace traditional family values and
entrepreneurship. They disagree with many policies advanced by Democrats,
which enlarge the welfare state and have failed the Black community (DeVeaux,
1997; Jones, 1997; Lovelace, 1997; Randolph, 1995). Thus, we expect to see a
large number of Black conservatives who are also Republicans. Figure 5-18
displays the results.
There are considerable differences between the partisan preferences of
Black liberals and conservatives. However, they are not in the direction that
would normally be expected. Conservatives should identify with the Republican
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Party and not the Democratic Party. And to some extent, Conservatives do
identify with the Republican Party more than liberals. But more than a majority
of Black conservatives chose the Democratic Party (69%) and a small percent
(8%) chose the Republican Party. Despite the fact that many conservatives do not
identify with the Republican Party, we do find that a substantial portion of Black
conservatives, about 23% call themselves independent.
Black political commentators say that the lack of Republican partisan
preferences by Black conservatives results from various factors, which include the
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party’s lack of outreach to Black constituencies and the hesitation by Blacks to
admit that they are Republican (Ashbee, 1999). Many Black conservatives
believe that the Republican Party does not see the African-American community
as group worth pursuing (Thomas, 1998). They have ignored Black constituents
and made many of them feel unwelcome in the party. However, the lack of Black
support for the Republican Party seems to be changing. Recently, scholars have
documented a growing number of African-American Republicans (Ponnuru,
1996). This is evident from the fact that over twenty-five percent of AfricanAmericans voted for Republican governors in New Jersey, California, and
Virginia (Reiland, 1996). Moreover, a record number of Black Republicans,
about 25, ran for Congress in 1994. In short, although Blacks who identify
themselves as conservatives do not choose the Republican Party, it is possible for
this group to realign with the Republican Party.
Constraint
According to Converse (1964) constraint is “the success we would have in
predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude,
that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes” (297). More specifically
constraint is evident through a consistency between issue positions. It is
measured through an examination of opinions on a wide range of issues and how
they relate to a respondent’s ideological identification. Table 5-8 contains the
results of the constraint measure. The hypothesis is confirmed.
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The overall constraint measure for the entire sample is .202, which indicates little
consistency between issue positions. Even more startling are the differences
found between Caucasians and African-Americans. The data from Table 5-9
indicates a .220 level of constraint for Caucasians and Table 5-10 shows a
constraint level of .118 for African-Americans. The hypothesis is confirmed-African-Americans-- have lower levels of issue consistency than Caucasians.
This finding suggests that ideology does not have the same policy specific
meanings for African-Americans as it does for Caucasians. For example, the
table reveals correlations between issue positions and ideological identification.
For African-Americans the highest correlation is on the government health
insurance question (.301). However, all other correlations are consistently low
(less than .2). When an examination is done between ideological identification
and issue positions among Caucasians, all correlations reach at least .27.
Therefore, there is more evidence to support the conclusion that conservatism
may mean something different for African-Americans than it does for Caucasians.
Summary of Findings
The data presented in this chapter provide support for all hypotheses proposed.
First, despite statements of political commentators and scholars, the data indicate
that there is indeed a Black conservative group in the electorate and it appears to
be growing. Second, support is also provided for the second set of hypotheses.
Black conservatives’ partisan preferences and electoral choices are different from
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those of Whites who identify themselves as conservative. Although substantial
proportions of African-Americans identify themselves as conservative, AfricanAmericans as a group continue to give overwhelming support to the Democratic
Party and its candidates. Altogether, these findings begged the final hypotheses,
which suggests that conservatism among Blacks means something different than it
does for Whites. Again, the hypotheses are supported. The issues examined
indicate that when Blacks say they are conservative it means something different
than when Whites say they are conservative.
We also expected differences between Blacks who said they were liberal
and those who said they were conservative. Black conservatives in the general
electorate should have the same issue positions as Black conservative
intellectuals. The results for this hypothesis are mixed. While some issues
indicated differences between Black liberals and conservatives, others did not.
Taken together, these findings suggest that Blacks who say they are
conservative may not be sure what conservatism means. This is clear when one
looks at the constraint measures of Caucasians and African-Americans. Generally
speaking, Caucasians have higher levels of constraint than African-Americans. In
my attempts to ascertain what Black conservatism means among the Black
masses, I found that this group confirmed the findings of Converse’s (1964)
seminal work, that when one moves down the ladder from political elites to the
mass public, there is a decrease in the level of ideological thinking. This suggest
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that political scientist may need to re-think traditional measures of ideology
especially in reference to African-Americans. It further suggests that the belief
systems of the mass of African-Americans do not mirror that the belief system of
Black conservative intellectuals.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

The objectives of this study were threefold. First, it attempted to document the
existence of a Black conservative group in the electorate. Second, it sought to
explain the development of Black conservatism. And last, it attempted to
examine if there were differences between Black and White conservatives by
looking at both groups’ party identification, electoral choices, and issue positions.
Although we knew a great deal about ideology as a concept, very little was known
about Blacks and ideology. While there has been anecdotal evidence supporting
the notion of a Black conservative group in the electorate, few scholars have
attempted to document this phenomenon empirically.
This research also sought to address the need for more research on
ideological identification among African-Americans. Data from the NBES, a
national survey of African-Americans provided a large enough sample of AfricanAmericans, to be able to examine differences that existed in the African-American
community. More specifically, it answered claims of an emerging conservative
group in the African-American community. It also examined African-American
ideological identification and its consistency with issue positions.
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This research assumed that ideological thinking is not a dichotomous
characteristic, such that people either do or do not think ideologically. Instead
this research assumed that there are various levels at which individuals are
capable of applying the liberal-conservative continuum to political objects.
Keeping this in mind, this research measured ideology using the standard seven
point scale. This was not an attempt to by-pass the debate surrounding ideology.
Rather it was an attempt to examine exactly how respondents use ideological
labels. In fact, scholars have recognized that even voters who are not politically
sophisticated use ideology when they vote (Jacoby, 1995).
Additions to the Literature
Research dealing with ideology has various shortcomings. Most of the research
on conservatism in America ignores the existence of a Black conservative group.
The few studies that have attempted to discuss conservatism among AfricanAmericans either fail to examine the historical context of conservatism in the
Black community or fail empirically to demonstrate that there are segments of the
Black population that identify with conservatism. This research began with the
hope of merging several elements of research together. First it sought to bring
ideology to the forefront of the minds of political scientists by reviewing the
seminal works of Campbell et. al (1960) and Converse, (1964). It has also
attempted to review the debates surrounding ideology in the electorate and its
importance in determining electoral behavior. The new element here is the
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analysis of conservatism among African-Americans, its existence, development,
and resurgence
African-American Conservatism
The hypotheses were as follows. I expected to find an increasing number of
African-Americans identifying themselves as conservative. More specifically,
between 1972 to 1998, there would be an increase in self-identified conservatism
among Blacks. Contrary to previous research, the hypothesis was confirmed.
There is a long-term trend toward conservatism among African-Americans. The
proportion of African-Americans identifying themselves as conservative doubled
during the time period studied. Taking into account both the NES and the NBES,
the data indicate that somewhere between one-fourth and one-third of AfricanAmericans identify themselves as conservative. Although this is not a large
proportion of the Black population, it is a substantial enough to warrant further
investigation. In fact, a fourth of the Black vote is all the Republican Party
believes it needs to establish dominance. Republican strategists argue that the
loss of the Black vote was a critical weakness. They state that the only way the
GOP would be a majority party is if it reached out to Blacks (Ashbee, 1999).
During the late 1970s, the GOP implemented a “Twenty Percent” solution
program. This program was set up to assist the Party in its recruitment of
African-Americans. The argument goes that if the Republican Party increased its
share of the Black vote by “20%”, it could establish dominance (Bolce, De Maio,
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& Muzzio, 1992). Therefore, even though there is a small sub-set of AfricanAmerican conservatives, this group is large enough to possibly return the White
House to the Republican Party and establish it as the majority party.
Partisan Preferences and Electoral Choices
However, after examining the partisan preferences and electoral choices of Black
conservatives one finds that the Republican Party may want to increase its efforts
to attract Black voters. After documenting the existence of a Black conservative
group, their partisan preferences and electoral choices were examined. It was
hypothesized that Black conservatives’ partisan identification and electoral
preferences were different from Whites who identified themselves as
conservative. Once more the hypothesis was confirmed. Although nearly a third
of African-Americans identify themselves as conservative, around eighty percent
of all African-Americans preferred the Democratic Party while less than tenpercent chose the Republican Party. This is not surprising because when it comes
to the Republican Party there has always been a gulf between the voting behavior
and partisan identification of African-Americans (Ashbee, 1999). This finding
supports previous research which states that African-Americans overwhelmingly
support the Democratic Party (Meyerson, 1984; Tryman, 1986; Welch & Foster,
1987; Muzzio, 1992; Bolce, De Maio & Muzzio, 1992; Dawson, 1995; Goode,
1996; Simpson, 1998).
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The Issues
The next hypotheses dealt with the issue positions of Black conservatives. It was
hypothesized that Black conservatism means something different than
conservatism among Whites. Therefore we expected differences between the
issue positions of Black and White conservatives. This hypothesis is confirmed.
On several issues including government spending on food stamps, laws protecting
homosexuals, and the ratings of Gingrich and Farrakhan, the Black conservative
position was opposite of the White conservative position.
This finding suggests two things. First, there may be a difference between
Black and White conservative belief systems. This suggests that Black
conservatism is different from White conservatism. It was suggested that Black
conservatism deals more with social and moral concerns than with political issues.
Black conservative intellectuals emphasize self-reliance, entrepreneurship, and
life-style choices. In fact, no element of Black conservatism emphasizes politics
or African-Americans participation in the political system. Instead, conservatism
for Blacks is seen as a belief in self-restraint, centrality of character, and
economic self-help. These suspicions have been confirmed.
This finding may also suggest that Black conservatives may not
understand what conservatism means. This is evident by the fact AfricanAmericans in the general electorate do not hold the same views as Black
conservative intellectuals. To see if this is the case, it was hypothesized that
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Black conservatives would have different issue positions than Black liberals. This
hypothesis was confirmed on all but two of the issues examined. There were
significant differences between Black conservatives and liberals on questions
concerning laws protecting homosexuals, government aid to Blacks, the progress
that had been made in ending discrimination, Blacks shopping in only Black
stores, and Black partisan preferences. Suprisingly, however, on the question that
taps into whether or not minorities should be given special consideration in hiring,
there were no differences between Black liberals and conservatives.
This research confirms the work of earlier scholars. It suggests that
Blacks in the general electorate may not understand what conservatism means or
may have a different understanding of conservatism. It also suggests that Blacks
in the general electorate do not have the same views White conservatives or Black
conservative intellectuals. Moreover, this research found that African-Americans
had considerably lower levels of constraint than Caucasians. This suggests that
that ideology does not have the same policy specific meaning for AfricanAmericans that it has for Caucasians. So, this research asks, what does
conservatism mean for the mass of Blacks?
Further research should seek to probe into African-American ideology to
ascertain how Blacks view the terms “liberal” and “conservative”. A number of
studies and commentaries examine what conservatism means for Black
intellectuals, but none address what being a conservative means for the masses.
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More specifically, future research should seek to define what conservatism means
among African-Americans in the general electorate. Either in-depth interviews or
focus groups could accomplish this goal. The main objective would be to
examine the mass of Blacks who say they are conservative and to find what it
means to them to be conservative. This would allow scholars to ascertain what
respondents mean when they call themselves conservative. This will add
significantly to the literature because most research that looks at ideology ignores
how Blacks view ideology. This research could also address the lack of constraint
among African-American conservatives.
Limitations
It is obvious that these findings have several limitations. First, research suggests
that there are myriad problems with survey data. Survey data often leads to a
description of the electorate as “schizophrenic” because their views change
quickly and drastically (Knight, 1999). There is also some question as to whether
or not the electorate really understands abstract ideological concepts. Also, one
should be wary of judging ideology through the self-identification questions
because several authors have concluded that there is little consistency between
ideology and issue positions (Smith, 1990; Luttbeg & Gant, 1984; Converse,
1964). And to some extent, the findings here confirm the suspicions of these
scholars. This research found that Blacks who say they are conservative might
not actually understand what it means to be conservative. This is evident by the
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fact that there were major differences between Black and White conservatives and
negligible differences between Black liberals and conservatives. Thus, one could
conclude that among Blacks “self-declared conservatism seems to have little
operational meaning” (Welch & Foster, 1987). However, this conclusion may be
without foundation because definitions and issues examined in this research are
based on how political scientists view conservatism and not how AfricanAmericans view the term. Thus this research has encountered the same problems
Converse (1964) had when he assumed that the mass public’s belief system
mirrored the belief system of elites. This research assumes that AfricanAmerican’s belief systems are the same as the belief systems of Caucasians,
which has severely limited this research.
Scholars have also urged caution when using the standard seven point
scale of ideology because of the large proportion of missing values it produces.
This is a result of the fact that respondents had not thought about the terms much
or that they did not know what they meant. This measure, however, is the only
available source of information we have to look at ideology over time. It gives us
a point of reference dating back to 1972, when the NES began asking questions
concerning ideological self-identification. Furthermore, this measure is the only
on African-American ideology over time. Although there is criticism of this
measure of ideology, Lyons and Scheb (1992) conclude, “the liberal-conservative
self-identification measure retains considerable utility (575).” Moreover, there
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were also comparison problems between the two data sets utilized. The format
and coding of the questions presented major problems for comparison.
Implications
In short, I have examined trends in ideology between 1972 to 1998. Overall, I
found a conservative trend among African-Americans since 1972. This
contradicts most previous research (Welch & Foster, 1987; Welch & Combs,
1985; Seltzer & Smith, 1985). Moreover, I found that African-Americans are
more likely than Whites to change their political views. This research also
documents that there is not much cohesion in the ideological identifications,
partisanship, and electoral choices of African-Americans. Although a third of
African-Americans say they are conservative, as a group, they are still
overwhelmingly loyal to the Democratic Party. However, this cohesiveness is
present when we examine Caucasians. Equal proportions of Caucasians who
identify themselves as conservative support the Republican Party. The meaning
of the liberal-conservative dimensions continues to be diverse among the
electorate, especially when we compare African-Americans to Caucasians.
African-Americans who identify themselves as conservative could play a
large role in the realignment of the political parties. This is not surprising
considering the fact that African-Americans realigned with the Democratic Party
after the Great Depression. Liberal and conservative camps need to keep in mind
that African-Americans fluctuate in their political attitudes. This is evident by the
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fact that the proportion of those identifying themselves as conservative doubled
during the time period studied. This could possibly have substantial effects on
presidential elections if the Republican Party continues its “Twenty Percent”
solution program. In fact, recent efforts by the Republican Party have already
proven successful. They have Black Republicans in Congress and several of their
gubernatorial and mayoral candidates have received support from AfricanAmericans. Therefore, neither liberals nor conservatives should take AfricanAmericans for granted. In other words, African-American voters should be seen
as important players in electoral politics. The parties should actively seek to
attract their support.

137

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aldrich, John H. (1995). Politics and Parties in America. In Why Parties? The Origin
and Transformation of Political Parties in America. (Pp. 3-27). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Barker, Lucius J., Jones, Mack H., and Tate, Katherine. (1999). The Quest for Political
Power. In African Americans and the American Political System (pp. 72-106).
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Barber, James. (1980). The Pulse of Politics. In The Pulse of Politics (Pp. 13-22). New
York: Norton & Company.
Bishop, George, Oldendick, Robert W., Tuchfarber, Alfred J., and Bennet, Stephen.
(1978). The Changing Structure of Mass Belief Systems: Fact or Artifact? The
Journal of Poltics 40:781-787.
Bishop, George F., Tuchfarber, Alfred J., and Oldendick, Robert W. (1978). Change in
the Structure of American Political Attitudes: The Nagging Question of Question
Wording. American Journal of Political Science 22:250-269.
Bolce, Louis, De Maio, Gerald, & Muzzio, Douglas. (1992). Blacks and the Republican
Party: The 20 Percent Solution. Political Science Quarterly 107:63-79.
Boyer, Dave. (1998). Black Conservatives Weave Political Web. Insight on the News
14:39-40.
Burnham, Walter Dean. (1970). Toward a Definition of Critical Realignment. In
Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (Pp. 1-33). New
York: WW Norton.
Byerman, Keith. (1995). Hip-Hop Spirituality: African-American Cultural Criticism.
College Literature 22:134-142.
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes. (1960).
The American Voter. New York: Wiley.
Cassel, Carol A. (1984). Issues in Measurement: The “Levels of Conceptualization”
Index of Ideological Sophistication. American Journal of Political Science
28:418-429.
Collins, Ronald K. L. and Skover, David. 1988. Liberal Legal Scholarship, Michigan
Law Review 87:189,195.
139

Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Feldman, Stanley. (1981). The Origins and Meaning of
Liberal/Conservative Self-Identification. American Journal of Political Science
25:617-645.
Converse, Philip & Markus, Gregory B. (1993). Plus Ca Change…The New CPS
Election Study Panel. In Richard Niemi and Herbert Weisberg (Eds.). Classics in
Voting Behavior. (Pp. 43-53). Washington: CQ Press.
Converse, Philip. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Public. In Ideology and
Discontent ed. David E. Apter (Ed.). Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Cromartie, Michael. (1996). Conquering the Enemy Within. Christianity Today 4:17-21.
Dawson, Michael C. (1994). Behind the mule: Race and Class in African-American
Politics. Princeton, N.J : Princeton University Press.
Eisenstadt, Peter. (Ed.). (1999). Black Conservatism: Essays in Intellectual and
Political History. New York: Garland Publishing Company.
Faryna, Stan, Stetson, Brad, & Conti, Joseph G. (Eds.). (1997). Black and Right: The
Bold New voice of Black Conservatives in America. Westport: Praeger.
Gaiter, Dorothy. (1991, July 4). Against the Grain: Black Conservatives Gain Clout in
US Beyond Their Numbers. The Wall Street Journal Europe [on-line serial],
Available: Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Gilliam, Jr., Franklin. (1986). Black America: Divided by Class? Public Opinion 9:5360.
Goode, Stephen. (1997). Conservative Blacks Prepare for the Future. Insight on the
News 12:15-18.
Goode, Stephen. (1997). Making Headway with the Masses. Insight on the News 13:1416.
Hagner, Paul. R. & Pierce, John C. (1982). Correlative Characteristics of Levels of
Conceptualization in The American Public 1956-1976. The Journal of Politics
44:779-807.
Holm, John D. and Robinson, John P. (1978). Ideological Identification and the
American Voter. Public Opinion Quarterly 42:235-246.

140

Hwant, Sean-Shong, Fitzpatrick, Kevin M. and Helms, David. (1998). Class Differences
in Racial Attitidues: a Divided Black America? Sociological Perspectives
41:367-381.
Jacoby, William G. (1986). Levels of Conceptualization and Reliance on the LiberalConservative Continuum. The Journal of Politics 48:423-432.
Jacoby, William. (1995). The Structure of Ideological Thinking in the American
Electorate. American Journal of Political Science 39:314-335.
Jones, Mack. (1987). The Political Thought of the New Black Conservatives: An
Analysis, Explanation and Interpretation. In Franklin D. Jones (Ed.) Readings in
American Political Issues (pp. 23-49). Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Hunt Publishing
Company.
Karenga, Maulana. (1986). Social Ethics and the Black Family An Alternative Analysis.
The Black Scholar 17:41-54.
Kerlinger, F. N. (1980). Liberalism and Conservatism: The Nature and Structure of
Social Attitudes. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Knight, Kathleen & Erikson, Robert S. (1997). Ideology in the 1990s. In Barbara
Norrander and Clyde Wilcox (Eds.), Understanding Public Opinion (pp. 91-110).
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc.
Knight, Kathleen. (1985). Ideology in the 1980 Elections: Ideological Sophistication
Does Matter. The Journal of Politics 47:828-853.
Knight, Kathleen. (1999). Liberalism and Conservatism. In John P. Robinson, Phillip R.
Shaver, & Lawrence S. Wrightman (Eds.), Measures of Political Attitudes (pp.
59-158). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
LeBlanc, Hugh L. & Merrin, Mary Beth. (1977). Mass Belief Systems Revisited. The
Journal of Politics 39:1082-1087.
Levitin, Teresa E. and Miller, Warren E. (1979). Ideological Interpretations of
Presidential Elections. The American Political Science Review 73:751-771.
Lexington, Black, Proud-and Republican. (1995). The Economist 335:26.
Luttbeg, Norman & Gant, Michael. (1985). The Failure of Liberal/Conservative
Ideology as a Cognitive Structure. Public Opinion Quarterly 49:80-93.

141

Luttbeg, Norman & Gant, Michael. (1995). American Electoral Behavior 1952-1992
Second Edition. Itasca, Illinois: FE Peacock Publishers.
Lyons, William & Scheb, John. (1992). Ideology and Candidate Evaluation in the 1984
and 1988 Presidential Elections. The Journal of Politics 54:573-584.
Maddox, William S. and Lilie Stuart A. (1984). Beyond Liberal and Conservative:
Reassessing the Political Spectrum. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute.
McClosky, Herbert. (1952). Conservatism and Personality. The American Political
Science Review 52:27-45.
McClosky, Herbert. (1964). Consensus and Ideology in American Politics. The
American Political Science Review 58:361-382.
Meyerson, Adam. (1984). Conservatives and Black Americans. Policy Review 30:40-42.
Miller, Alan. (1992). Are Self-Proclaimed Conservatives Really Conservative? Trends
in Attitudes and Self-Identification among the Young. Social Forces 71:195-210.
Nie, Norman & Andersen, Kristi. (1974). Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political
Change and Attitude Structure. The Journal of Politics 36:450-591.
Niemi, Richard and Weisberg, Herbert. (1993). Dealignment and Realignment in the
Current Period. In Richard Niemi and Herbert Weisberg (Eds.), Controversies in
Voting Behavior, 3rd ed. (Pp. 268-283). Washington: CQ Press.
Niemi, Richard and Weisberg, Herbert. (1993). Do Voters Think Ideologically? In
Richard Niemi and Herbert Weisberg (Eds.), Classics in Voting Behavior. (Pp.
43-53). Washington: CQ Press.
Peffley, Mark A. and Hurwitz, Jon. (1985). A Hierarchical Model of Attitude
Constraint. American Journal of Political Science 29:871-890.
Pierce, John C. (1970). Party Identification and the Changing Role of Ideology in
American Politics. Midwest Journal of Political Science 14:25-42.
Pohlmann, Marcus D. (1999). Studying Race and Politics in America. In Black Politics
in Conservative America. 2nd Ed. (pp. 1-34). New York: Longman.
Pomper, Gerald M. (1972). From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters,
1956-1968. The American Political Science Review 66:415-428.
Ponnuru, Ramesh. (1996). Republican Like Me. National Review 48:21-23.
142

Puddington, Arch. (1995). Speaking of Race. Commentary 100:21-27.
Randolph, Lewis A. (1995). A Historical Analysis and Critique of Contemporary Black
Conservatism. The Western Journal of Black Studies 19:149-163.
Reiland, Ralph. (1996). Black Republicanism. The American Enterprise 7:8-10.
Reed, Adolph. (1997). The Descent of Black Conservatism. The Progressive 61:18-21.
Repass, David E. (1971). Issue Salience and Party Choice. The American Political
Science Review 65(2):389-400.
Robinson, John P. & Fleishman, John A. (1984). Ideological Trends in American Public
Opinion. The Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science
472:50-60.
Robinson, John P. & Fleishman, John A. (1988). The Polls-A Report Ideological
Identification: Trends and Interpretations of the Liberal-Conservative Balance.
Public Opinion Quarterly 52:134-145.
Robinson, John. (1984). The Ups and Downs and Ins and Outs of Ideology. Public
Opinion 7:12-15.
Scheb, John M. (1990). Ideology, Issue Space and the Dimensionality Problem: A
Research Note. Southeastern Political Review 18:173-184.
Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M. (1986). The Cycles of American Politics. In The Cycles of
American History (Pp. 23-50). Boston: Houghton Miflin Company.
Seltzer, Richard & Smith, Robert C. (1985). Race and Ideology: A Research Note
Measuring Liberalism and Conservatism in Black America. Phylon 46:98-105.
Simpson, Andrea. (1998). The Tie That Binds. New York: New York University Press.
Singer, James W. (1981). With a Friend in the White House, Black Conservatives Are
Speaking Out. National Journal 13:435-439.
Smith, Eric R.A.N. (1980). The Levels of Conceptualization: False Measures of
Ideological Sophistication. American Political Science Review 74:685-696.
Smith, Tom. (1990). Liberal and Conservative Trends in the United States Since World
War II. Public Opinion Quarterly 54:479-507.
143

Stimson, James A. (1975). Belief Systems: Constraint, Complexity, and the 1972
Election. American Journal of Political Science 19:393-417.
Sullivan, John L., Pierson, James E., Marcus, George, & Feldman, Stanley. (1979). The
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Stability of Mass
Belief Systems. American Journal of Political Science 23:176-186.
Sullivan, John, Piereson, James E., & Marcus, George E. (1993). Ideological Constraint
in the Mass Public: A Methodological Critique and Some New Findings. In
Richard Niemi and Herbert Weisberg (Eds.). Classics in Voting Behavior. (Pp.
66-73). Washington: CQ Press.
Toler, Deborah. (1993). Black Conservatives: Part One. The Public Eye Newsletter
7(3):1-9.
Toler, Deborah. (1993). Black Conservatives: Part Two. The Public Eye Newsletter
7(4):1-9.
Trotter, Joe W. (1995). Reflections on the African American Experience, Social History,
and the Resurgence of Conservatism in American Society. Journal of Social
History 29:85-90.
Tryman, Mfanya D. (1986). Blacks and the Democratic Party: The Dissolution of an
Irreconcilable Marriage. The Black Scholar 17:28-32.
Welch, Susan, Gruhl, John, Comer, John, Rigdon, Susan, and Vermeer, Jan. (1999).
Understanding American Government (pp. 76-97). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company.
Welch, Susan & Combs, Michael. (1985). Intra-racial Differences in Attitudes of
Blacks: Class Cleavages or Consensus? Phylon 46 :91-97.
Welch, Susan & Foster, Lorn. (1987). Class and Conservatism in the Black Community.
American Politics Quarterly 15:445-470.
West, Cornel. (1992). Assessing Black Neoconservatism. In Floyd W. Hayes, III (Ed.) A
Turbulent Voyage: Readings in African-American Studies (pp. 650-656). San
Diego, CA: Collegiate Press.
West, Cornel. (1994). Demystifying the New Black Conservatism. In Race Matters (pp.
71-90). New York, NY: Vintage Books.

144

White, John. (1990). Booker T. Washington: Black Enigma. In Black Leadership in
America: From Booker T. Washington to Jesse Jackson (pp. 17-46). New York:
Longman Inc.
White, John. (1990). Marcus Garvey: Jamaican Messiah. In Black Leadership in
America: From Booker T. Washington to Jesse Jackson (pp. 75-108). New York:
Longman Inc.
White, John. (1990). Malcolm X: Sinner and Convert. In Black Leadership in America:
From Booker T. Washington to Jesse Jackson (pp. 145-172). New York:
Longman Inc.
Williams, Linda F. (1986). Significant Trends in Black Voter Attitudes. The Black
Scholar 17:24-32.

145

APPENDIX

SELECTED VARIABLES
NES Cumulative File 1948-1997
Variable CF0105
Respondent’s Race
Variable CF0301
Partisan Identification
Variable CF0803
Ideological Identification
Variable CF0804
Categorized Self Placement
Variable CF0704
Vote Choice in Presidential Elections
1996 NES
Variable 960284
Variable 960285
Variable 960288
Variable 960368
Variable 960417
Variable 960450
Variable 960463
Variable 960479
Variable 960483
Variable 960487
Variable 960496
Variable 960519
Variable 960543
Variable 960578
Variable 960503
Variable 960610
Variable 961193
Variable 961197
1998 NES
Variable 980339
Variable 980399
Variable 980673
1984 NBES
Variable 2100
Variable 2103
1996 NBES
QG1
QG2
QM1G
QM1I

Newt Gingrich Feeling Thermometer
Colin Powell Feeling Thermometer
Louis Farrakhan Feeling Thermometer
Summary of Self-Placement on Liberal/Conservative scale
Party Identification
Self-Placement on Services Spending Scale
Self-Placement on Defense Spending Scale
Self-Placement on Government Health Insurance Scale
Self-Placement on Guarantee Jobs Scale
Self-Placement on Government Aid to Blacks Scale
Self-Placement on Spending on Food Stamps
Self-Placement on Crime Reduction Scale
Self-Placement on Women’s Rights Scale
Attend Religious Services
Abortion Scale
Summary of Respondent’s Education
Laws Protecting Homosexuals
Favor/Oppose the Death Penalty
Partisan Identification
Liberal/Conservative Scale
Respondent’s Race

Liberal/Conservative Identification
Summary: Respondent’s Liberal-Conservative Placement.
Liberal/Conservative Scale
Partisan Identification
Louis Farrakhan Feeling Thermometer
Newt Gingrich Feeling Thermometer
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QM1J
Q7SA
QS8A
QU3
QY3
E2C
E5
E9B
H1
H2
M1B

Colin Powell Feeling Thermometer
Self Placement on Government Aid to Blacks
Government Aid to Blacks
Church Attendance
Education
Blacks Only Shop In Black Stores
Progress Made in Ending Discrimination
Minorities Given Special Consideration in Hiring
Laws Protecting Homosexuals
Death Penalty
Food Stamp Spending
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AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDEOLOGY
NES Cumulative Data File
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CAUCASIAN IDEOLOGY
NES Cumulative Data File
60%

50%

Percentage

40%

30%

20%

Liberal
Moderate
Conservative

10%

0%
1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

Year

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

151

AFRICAN-AMERICAN PARTISAN PREFERENCES
NES Cumulative Data File
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CAUCASIAN PARTISAN PREFERENCES
NES Cumulative Data File
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AFRICAN-AMERICAN ELECTORAL CHOICE
NES Cumulative Data File
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CAUCASIAN ELECTORAL CHOICE
NES Cumulative Data File
80%

70%

60%

Percentage

50%
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40%
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***RELIGIOUSITY
1996 National Election Study
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%

Percent

60.00%
Weekly or more
Few A year
Never

50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Liberal

Moderate
Ideological Identification
***p<.001**p<.05p<.1
Chi Square Statistic
n=831

Conservative
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RELIGIOUSITY
1996 National Black Election Study
90%
80%
70%

Percent

60%
Weekly or more
Few a Year
Never

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Liberal

Moderate
Ideological Identification
***p<.001**p<.05p<.1
Chi Square Statistic
n=992

Conservative

157

***EDUCATION
1996 National Election Study
70%
60%

Percent

50%
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Grade School

High School

Some College/AA Degree

Ideological Identification
***p<.001**p<.05p<.1
Chi Square Statistic
n=1166

Bachelor/Beyond
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***EDUCATION
1996 National Black Election Study
50%
45%

42%

41%

40%
35%
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative

Percent

30%
25%
20%
15%
15%
10%
5%

3%

0%
Grade School

High School

Some College/AA Degree

Ideological Identification
***p<.001**p<.05p<.1
Chi Square Statistic
n=993

Bachelor/beyond
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Table 2-1
IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

1970 1971 1972
1979 1980
CPS/U. Michigan
Liberal
19%
21%
17%
19%
16%
Conservative
26%
26%
31%
27%
28%
GSS (NORC)
Liberal
31%
30%
29%
29%
28%
26%
Conservative
30%
30%
31%
32%
24%
34%
Gallup
Liberal
28%
25%
Conservative
46%
45%
CBS/NY Times
Liberal
22%
22%
20%
21%
Conservative
30%
27%
34%
30%
Roper
Liberal
25%
Conservative
40%
Robinson, John. (1984). The Ups and Downs and Ins and Outs of Ideology. Public Opinion 7:12-15.

1981

1982

1983

15%
27%
27%
32%

24%
35%

20%
34%

19%
32%

20%
44%
18%
30%
19%
47%

22%
43%
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TABLE 5-1
AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
LIBERAL

54% 60% 55% 44% 40% 31% 33% 37% 33% 33% 39% 25% 36% 40%

MODERATE

31% 22% 34% 41% 30% 37% 41% 37% 34% 40% 38% 51% 31% 26%

CONSERVATIVE

14% 18% 12% 15% 30% 32% 26% 27% 33% 27% 24% 24% 33% 34%

N

118

85

119

113

83

74

Source: NES Cumulative File, Variable 804 & 105

127

202

154

140

187

122

124

134
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TABLE 5-3
CAUCASIAN IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

LIBERAL

23%

23%

21%

25%

24%

22%

25%

22%

22%

24%

27%

19%

25%

34%

MODERATE

38%

39%

38%

36%

31%

35%

33%

37%

31%

36%

31%

33%

30%

26%

CONSERVATIVE

39%

38%

42%

39%

46%

43%

42%

41%

47%

40%

40%

48%

46%

40%

N

1411

1045

1356

1525

908

815

1392

1399

1224

1136

1572

1211

1167

1047

Source: NES Cumulative File, Variable 804 & 105
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TABLE 5-4
AFRICAN-AMERICAN PARTISAN PREFERENCES
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
DEMOCRAT

77% 86% 86% 83% 84% 91% 79% 86% 82% 80% 79% 82% 81% 79%

REPUBLICAN

11%

4%

6%

8%

8%

3%

10%

6%

12% 12%

8%

10%

8%

INDEPENDENT

12% 10%

8%

9%

7%

5%

11%

8%

6%

8%

13%

8%

11% 18%

N

261

219

223

180

147

242

317

260

249

308

199

206

138

Source: NES Cumulative File, Variable 301 & 105

4%

141
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TABLE 5-5
CAUCASIAN PARTISAN PREFERENCES
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

DEMOCRAT

49%

49%

47%

52%

49%

52%

45%

45%

41%

49%

46%

25%

43%

36%

REPUBLICAN

37%

36%

38%

34%

37%

36%

44%

42%

47%

40%

42%

51%

47%

33%

INDEPENDENT

14%

14%

15%

14%

14%

12%

11%

12%

12%

11%

12%

24%

10%

31%

N

2357

1366

1936

1953

1377

1220

1900

1757

1668

1630

2045

1496

1439

977

Source: NES Cumulative File, Variable 301 & 105
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TABLE 5-6
AFRICAN AMERICAN ELECTORAL CHOICE
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
1972

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

DEMOCRAT

86%

94%

93%

89%

90%

91%

96%

REPUBLICAN

13%

5%

7%

9%

8%

5%

1%

OTHER

1%

1%

1%

2%

2%

4%

3%

N

139

106

106

131

125

189

108

Source: NES Cumulative File, Variable 704 & 105
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TABLE 5-7
CAUCASIAN ELECTORAL CHOICE
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
1972

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

DEMOCRAT

30%

45%

33%

36%

41%

42%

48%

REPUBLICAN

69%

53%

56%

63%

58%

37%

42%

OTHER

1%

2%

11%

1%

1%

21%

10%

1447

1208

856

1231

1052

1425

995

N

Source: NES Cumulative File, Variable 704 & 105
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SAMPLE

Ideology

961269
Ideology
Help Blacks
Guarantee Jobs
Reduce Crime
Women's Rights
Protect Env./Jobs
Abortion
Services/Spending
Defense Spending
Govt. Health Ins.

Help
Blacks

TABLE 5-8
CORRELATION MATRIX
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
Guar.
Reduce Women’s. Protect Abortion Services Defense
Jobs
Crime
Rights Env/Jobs
Spending Spending

960487
960483
960519
960543
960523
960503
960450
960463
.300
.297
.247
.264
.254
-0.263
-0.333
0.254
0.475
0.27
0.121
0.128
-0.058
-0.303
0.165
0.213
0.134
0.092
-0.014
-0.385
0.157
0.162
0.229
-0.184
-0.137
0.229
0.237
-0.257
-0.11
0.133
-0.14
-0.114
0.151
0.053
-0.152
-0.041

Constraint Measure (Average Correlation) = .202

Govt.
Health
Ins
960479
0.32
0.253
0.428
0.193
0.121
0.122
-0.095
-0.319
0.184
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CAUCASIANS

Ideology

961269
Ideology
Help Blacks
Guarantee Jobs
Reduce Crime
Women's Rights
Protect Env./Jobs
Abortion
Services/Spending
Defense Spending
Govt. Health Ins.

Help
Blacks

TABLE 5-9
CORRELATION MATRIX
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
Guar.
Reduce Women’s. Protect Abortion Services Defense
Jobs
Crime
Rights Env/Jobs
Spending Spending

960487
960483
960519
960543
960523
960503
960450
960463
.333
.320
.282
.278
.280
-0.302
-0.375
0.304
0.459
0.311
0.103
0.163
-0.063
-0.276
0.214
0.234
0.105
0.114
-0.064
-0.383
0.185
0.193
0.232
-0.173
-0.159
0.265
0.244
-0.266
-0.105
0.158
-0.149
-0.161
0.161
0.062
-0.162
-0.082

Constraint Measure (Average Correlation) = .220

Govt.
Health
Ins
960479
0.319
0.267
0.444
0.205
0.133
0.149
-0.115
-0.349
0.218
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AFRICANAMERICANS

Ideology

961269
Ideology
Help Blacks
Guarantee Jobs
Reduce Crime
Women's Rights
Protect Env./Jobs
Abortion
Services/Spending
Defense Spending
Govt. Health Ins.

Help
Blacks

TABLE 5-10
CORRELATION MATRIX
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
Guar.
Reduce Women’s. Protect Abortion Services Defense
Jobs
Crime
Rights Env/Jobs
Spending Spending

960487
960483
960519
960543
960523
960503
960450
960463
.116
.115
.037
.175
.88
0.01
0.069
-0.001
0.458
0.089
0.238
0.035
-0.034
-0.216
-0.111
0.074
0.316
0.092
0.01
-0.176
0.053
0.042
0.25
-0.284
0.052
0.041
0.159
-0.18
-0.11
0.031
-0.069
0.013
0.074
-0.001
-0.117
0.169

Constraint Measure (Average Correlation) = .118

Govt.
Health
Ins
960479
0.301
0.21
0.227
0.134
0.035
0.034
-0.209
-0.004
0.071
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